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* See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 616 (1990). In dissent, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission)
could adopt "limited measures to increase the number of competing licensees and to
encourage licensees to present varied views on issues of public concern." Id. However, the
FCC's authority to ensure diversity of viewpoint did not establish an interest sufficient to
withstand equal protection scrutiny. Id. at 616. Instead, O'Connor found that the FCC's
interest in providing diversity of broadcast programming and the regulatory policies it had
implemented to achieve this goal continues to be an "unsettled First Amendment issue."
Id.
** Visiting Professor, Howard University School of Law. Professor Worthy is the
former Chairman of the District of Columbia Public Service Commission. She also served
as both Vice-Chairman and then Chairman of the Communications Committee of the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC), and was appointed by the
FCC to the Federal/State Joint Board on Open Network Architecture.
The author wishes to thank Davida Grant and Mildred Bailey for their assistance in
researching the topics for this Article. Appreciation is due as well to Dean Henry Ramsey,
Jr., for his continued encouragement and support.
This article primarily focuses upon the harms inflicted on African-American children
by the use of racial stereotyping in television programming. The emphasis, however, is not
intended to suggest that negative stereotypical images in television broadcasting are lim-
ited solely to African-Americans.
This article proceeds from the premise that racism and racial discrimination are inher-
ently evil and offend the basic social and political principles of a democratic society. In
addition to the United States Constitution's guarantee of "equal protection of the laws,"
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, numerous federal and state statutes have been enacted that
prohibit racial discrimination in such areas as employment, voting rights, housing, and pub-
lic accommodation. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994). I concur
with David Kretzmer's definition of the terms "racism," "discrimination," and "racial prej-
udice." The word "racism," he explains, is "'the theory or idea that there is a causal link
between inherited physical traits and certain traits of personality, intellect, or culture and
combined with it, the notion that some races are inherently superior to others." David
Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 451-52 (1987). He
distinguishes "racism," a philosophy or belief, from "discrimination," a practice or form of
behavior. Id. at 452. "Racial prejudice," he argues, is a "psychological phenomenon ...
consist[ing] of negative attitudes directed in blanket fashion toward people belonging to
groups defined by reference to color, race, or ethnic or national origins." Id. at 452-53.
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Introduction
Racial dissention and divisiveness has been and continues to be
one of the most destructive and debilitating aspects of our society. In
The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B. DuBois predicted this conundrum at
the beginning of this century when he observed that: "the problem of
the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line."' Over half a
century after Dubois' prediction, the color-line problem reached its
pinnacle.
In 1967, the destructiveness of racism reached a climax when
eighty-eight people died in race riots in at least sixty-five cities in over
thirty states.2 Consequently, the federal government decided to deter-
mine the economic and social reasons underlying the tumult. Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson appointed a commission, headed by Governor
Otto Kerner of Illinois, to investigate "what happened, why it hap-
pened, and what could be done to prevent it from happening again."3
In making this assessment, the Kerner Commission also examined the
manner in which the white, male-dominated media had depicted mi-
norities in its coverage of the civil disturbance. Although the media
was not specifically identified as the cause of the racial unrest, the
Kerner Commission concluded that television and print media failed
to communicate "to the majority of their audience-which is white-a
sense of the degradation, misery, and hopelessness of living in the
ghetto. They [had also failed to communicate] to whites a feeling for
the difficulties and frustrations of being a Negro in the United States
1. W.E.B. DuBoIs, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 5 (1903).
2. For example, a racial incident in Newark, New Jersey resulted from the local gov-
ernment's refusal to address the long-standing housing shortage. SEAN D. CASHMAN, AF-
RICAN-AMERICANS AND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 1990-1991, at 207 (1991). Instead,
the city planned to demolish approximately 50 acres of slums in order to accommodate the
construction of a new medical school. Id. This decision led to five days-of rioting, in which
25 people died, 725 were injured, 1462 were arrested, and an estimated $15 million in
property damage resulted. Id. The book states that "[p]erhaps the worst riot of all oc-
curred in Detroit, beginning on July 23, 1967, when police raided an illegal African-Ameri-
can drinking club in the west side ghetto. The riot lasted five days. Governor George
Romney of Michigan could not keep the peace and requested federal troops from the
president. It took two airborne divisions to restore order, by which time forty-three people
were dead." Id.
3. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IN TELEVISION 1 (1977) [hereinafter WINDOW DRESSING] (citing KERNER
COMM'N, REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968) (Otto
Kerner, Chairman)). The Kerner Commission compiled its research results from a wide
range of sources: journalists, government officials, law enforcement officials, urban resi-
dents, and analysis of news reports contained in both television and print media. Michael
Ryan, Media Attitudes and News Preferences, J. BLACK STUD. 275, 276 (1982). The Kerner
Commission, Ryan notes, also convened a conference of media representatives. Id. at 275-
76.
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.. [and had] not shown understanding or appreciation of-and thus
[had] not communicated-a sense of Negro culture, thought or his-
tory."4 The report concluded that unless the media became more sen-
sitive to its portrayal of minorities, and Blacks in particular, these
stereotypical images would persist.'
In response to the Kerner Commission findings, the FCC promul-
gated regulations encouraging broadcasters to employ minorities.6 In
promulgating these regulations, the Commission assumed that a direct
relationship, a nexus, existed between minority employment and "di-
versity" in broadcast programming.7
4. In re Petition for Rule Making to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondis-
crimination in Their Employment Practices, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, para. 22 (1968) [hereinafter Nondiscrimination
Memorandum of 1968] (citing KERNER COMM'N, REPORT OF NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CIVIL DISORDERS 207-208 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT]). Michael Ryan ob-
serves that the Kerner Commission reached three conclusions:
First, that despite incidents of sensationalism, inaccuracies, and distortions, news-
papers, radio, and television, on the whole, made a real effort to give a balanced,
factual account of the 1967 disorders.
Second, that despite this effort, the portrayal of the violence that occurred last
summer failed to reflect accurately its scale and character. The overall effect was,
we believe, an exaggeration of both mood and event.
Third, and ultimately most important, we believe that the media have thus far
failed to report adequately on the causes and consequences of civil disorders and
the underlying problems of race relations.
KERNER REPORT, supra, at 201, quoted in Ryan, supra note 3, at 276-77.
5. See WINDOw DRESSING, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Nondiscrimination Memorandum of 1968, supra note 4, paras. 22-25. The Com-
mission stated:
The nation is confronted with a serious racial crisis. It is acknowledged that the
media cannot solve that crisis, but on all sides it has been emphasized that the
media can contribute greatly in many significant respects, particularly to under-
standing by white and black of the nature of the crisis and the possible remedial
actions, and that such understanding is a vital first and continuing step.... [T]he
[Kerner Commission] report makes clear what is only common sense in this situa-
tion-that there must be greater use of the Negro in journalism, since the Negro
journalist provides a most effective link with the ghetto: News organizations must
employ enough Negroes in positions of significant responsibility to establish an
effective link to Negro actions and ideas and to meet legitimate employment ex-
pectations.... The same considerations are applicable to the case of the Negro in
specific programming. This is not a matter on which this Commission can appro-
priately intervene. The judgment as to whether to use one performer or another
or a particular script approach in a particular program is wisely one beyond the
jurisdiction of this Commission. Rather, all we do is again raise the question in
context of the conscience of the broadcaster at this juncture of our national
affairs.
ld.
7. See WINDOW DRESSING, supra note 3, at 2 n.18. In response to the draft report of
Window Dressing, the FCC stated:
Programming is, of course, the essence of broadcast service in the public interest.
Recognizing this simple and fundamental premise, the Commission in 1968 ad-
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:509
DIVERSITY AND MINORITY STEREOTYPING IN TELEVISION
In recognition of the "dominant role" that television was begin-
ning to play in shaping perceptions and conveying information in
America,8 in 1977 the United States Civil Rights Commission con-
ducted a study of the portrayal of minorities on network news and in
dramatic programs. The study concluded that not only were minori-
ties under-represented on television, but also that, "when they [did]
appear they [were] frequently seen in token or stereotyped roles."9
The study further concluded that:
Television's portrayal of ... minorities and the potential impact of
these portrayals are issues of critical importance to the American
society. To the extent that viewers' beliefs, attitudes, and behavior
are affected by what they see on television, relations between the
races ... may be affected by television's limited and often stereo-
typed portrayals of men and women, both white and nonwhite. 10
Two years later, the United States Civil Rights Commission con-
ducted another study" to determine whether the portrayal of minori-
ties on television had improved.12 This study concluded that racial
monished all broadcast licensees to provide equal employment opportunities to
all persons without regard to their race .... [W]e agree that the lack of adequate
role models may have an adverse effect on minorities and women.... Increasing
numbers of minorities and women are now actively seeking employment in higher
status jobs in broadcasting .... Further, the period of improved programming for
minorities and women has followed and in part coincided with this agency's ef-
forts to encourage and promote improved job opportunities for minorities ....
Id. at 173 (quoting letter from Wallace E. Johnson, Chief, BB, to John A. Buggs, Staff
Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights (May 16, 1977) (emphasis added)).
8. WINDOW DRESSING, supra note 3, at I (noting that "[audiences placed] a higher
value on television as a source of information ... than on other media"). Although the
study focused on both minorities and women, the focus of my analysis is the effects of
stereotyping on African-Americans.
9. WINDOW DRESSING, supra note 3, at 3. The study noted that the "National Black
Feminist Organization (NBFO) objected to the demeaning portrayal of blacks during the
1974 [television] season," likening the minority stereotyping to the days of "Amos 'n'
Andy." Id. at 21. The NBFO listed several objections, which included: (1) Black shows are
slanted toward the ridiculous with no redeeming counter images; (2) When blacks are cast
as professional people, the characters they portray generally lack professionalism and give
the impression that black people are incapable and inferior in such position; (3) When
older persons are featured, black people are usually cast as shiftless derelicts or non-
productive individuals; and (4) Black children, by and large, have no worthy role models
on television. Id. at 21-22 (citing NBFO Lists TV Complaints and Protests "That's My
Mama," MEDIA REPORT TO WOMEN, Dec. 1, 1974, at 16).
10. WINDOW DRESSING, supra note 3, at ii.
11. The Civil Rights Commission believed that the subject matter deserved further
review "[b]ecause of the medium's capacity for fixing an image in the public mind." U.S.
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WINDOW DRESSING ON THE SET: AN UPDATE V (1979) [here-
inafter WINDOW DRESSING UPDATE].
12. WINDOW DRESSING UPDATE, supra note 11, at 7.
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stereotyping in the electronic media had not only continued, but in
some instances "actually intensified. 13
As the studies continued to reveal a lingering racial under-repre-
sentation and stereotyping of minorities in the media industry, 4 the
FCC abandoned its race-neutral regulatory policies. Instead, the FCC
attempted to increase minority ownership of broadcast facilities.' 5
These new regulatory programs hinged on the belief that increasing
the number of minority-owned broadcast facilities would further di-
versify broadcast programming. 16 The underlying rationale of the as-
sumption is that membership in a particular minority group results in
a similar perspective among its members, and that this perspective,
when held by broadcast facility owners, culminates in greater diversity
of viewpoint, thereby benefiting the public at large.' 7
The validity of the assumption that increased minority ownership
would increase diversity was hotly debated.'8 The FCC argued that
the "public convenience and interest" mandate of the Communica-
13. Interestingly, this later study raised another issue of equal importance: the effects
of television viewership on children. Id. at 44. Acknowledging that the social science data
in the field was "controversial," the study nonetheless found the results "suggest[ed] that
the potential effect of television on children [was] substantial." Id. at 46. The study deter-
mined that poor children devoted the greatest number of hours to television viewership
and that consequently, these same children had an increased tendency to believe in televi-
sion's reality. Id. at 50.
14. One commentator noted that "[six years after the FCC's [equal employment op-
portunity] policies were implemented, African-Americans and other minorities still held a
small percentage of management jobs in the broadcast industry. In 1977... while 64.9% of
the management positions at [40] selected. television stations were held by white males,
only 5.2%. and 4.4% were held by African-American males and African-American females
respectively." Akousa B. Evans, Are Minority Preferences Necessary? Another Look At
the Radio Broadcasting Industry, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 380, 386 n.29 (1990).
15. The FCC announced "tax certificate" and "distress sale" policies that were
designed to encourage minority ownership. See discussion infra notes 74-75.
16. The FCC proclaimed that "[aldequate representation of minority viewpoints in
programming serves not only the needs and interest of the minority community . . . [but
also] enhances the diversified programming which is a key objective ... of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934." Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978).
17. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 548-49 (1990).
18. Kathleen Kirby notes that "[t]he FCC has long offered a nexus between minority
ownership and programming diversity ... as justification for implementing minority en-
hancement credit and distress sale policies." Kathleen Kirby, Note, Shouldn't the Constitu-
tion Be Color Blind? Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, A Surprising Message on Racial
Preferences, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 403, 413 (1991) (emphasis added); see also Mathew L.
Spitzer, Justifying Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1991);
Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the Crossroads
of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REV. 583, 600 (1991); Samuel L.
Starks, Understanding Government Affirmative Action and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 41 DUKE L.J. 933, 962 (1992).
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tions Act of 1934,19 and the constitutional requirements imposed by
the First Amendment, obligated it to ensure "the widest possible dis-
semination of, information from diverse and antagonistic sources."20
Moreover, the FCC took comfort in its position. The assumed exist-
ence of a "nexus" was supported in varying degrees by the Execu-
tive,2' Congress,22 and the Judiciary.23
Nearly thirty years after the establishment of the Kerner Com-
mission, we still find our society grappling with the same racial
problems. Racial disturbances in the form of physical violence and
property destruction continue to plague this nation.24 Moreover, so-
19. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307, 309 (1991).
20. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
21. Professor Neal Devins explains that President Carter expressed a belief that past
racial discrimination was, in the main, "responsible for minority under-representation in
broadcasting." Neal Devins, Congress, The FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 171 (citing Telecommunication Minority
Assistance Program, 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 1703, 1704). Moreover, Devins asserts that the
White House lobbied the FCC to establish the tax certificate and "distress sales" programs.
Id.
22. The Continuing Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1988 conditioned the availabil-
ity of funds for the FCC on the assurance that the minority ownership programs would
neither be examined nor altered. Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31 (1987). The Ap-
propriations Acts for fiscal years 1989 and 1990 contained similar provisions. Pub. L. No.
100-459, 102 Stat. 2216 (1990); Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 1020 (1991). The Report of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations explained that "promoting diversity of ownership
of broadcast properties satisfies important public policy goals" and that "[d]iversity of
ownership results in diversity of programming and improved service to minority and wo-
men audiences." S. REP. No. 182, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987). Moreover, when Con-
gress authorized the FCC to use a "lottery system" in awarding broadcasting licenses, it
proscribed preferences for minority applicants:
Significant preference will be granted to applicants or groups of applicants, the
grant to which of the license or permit would increase the diversification of own-
ership of the media of mass communications. To further diversify the ownership
of the media of mass communication, an additional significant preference shall be
granted to any applicant controlled by a member or members of a minority group.
Pub. L. No. 97-259, 96 Stat. 1087 (1982) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(3)(A)).
23. The Supreme Court has repeatedly applauded the FCC's policies as consistent
with the public interest standard and the First Amendment goal of promoting diversity of
viewpoint on the airwaves. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting,
436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (stating that it is not incompatible with the Communications Act
"for the Commission to conclude that the maximum benefit to the 'public interest' would
follow from allocation of broadcast licenses so as to promote diversification of the mass
media as a whole").
24. The newspapers, magazines, and periodicals of the 1990s are filled with reports of
racial incidents. See, e.g., Alan Finder, Tension in Washington Heights, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
1992, at Al; Maria Cone, Panel Urged to Ease Path of Minorities, L.A. TIMES, May 15,
1992, at B4; Police Guilty of Killing Black Driver, GUARDIAN, Aug. 24, 1993, at 18; Rick
Bragg & Janita Poe, Miami is Calm but Angry, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, June 27, 1991, at
1A; Dierdre Stoelzle, Nearly 700 March in Selma Protest; Police Brutality Alleged, WASH.
POST, Feb. 11, 1990, at A18; Davide Kocieniewski, Poor Get Short End of Nightstick,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 3, 1993, at 3; Christopher B. Daly, Boston Is Pondering Questions of Ra-
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cial scientists have raised serious questions regarding the role that tel-
evision has played both in increasing the level of violence and
intensity of racial disharmony in America.2 5 An American Psycholog-
ical Association study revealed that ethnic minorities are still "nega-
tively stereotyped as criminals, dangerous characters, or victims of
violence."26
For the past three decades, the Commission has maintained that
the best means to achieve "diversity of viewpoint" and to eliminate
minority under-representation is through the proliferation of minor-
ity-owned broadcast facilities.27 Recently, the validity of the FCC's
"public interest" rationale has come under both political and legal at-
tack. Congress has, without sound justification and with minimal criti-
cal debate, eliminated the FCC's tax certificate program.28 Moreover,
cism, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1990, at Al; Sheridan Lyons, Arrest Blamed on "Furman" Syn-
drome, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 26, 1995, at 1B; Richard Morin, A Distorted Image of
Minorities, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 1995, at 1.
25. See, e.g., CAMILLE 0. COSBY, TELEVISION'S IMAGEABLE INFLUENCES (Wellington
& Chiu, eds. 1994). Dr. Cosby refers to a USA Today article describing comments pro-
vided at the American Psychiatric Association's meeting on the impact of television:
Dr. Brandon Centenvall [sic] gave strong evidence that T.V. and film violence is
the cause of fully 50% of the crime and violence in our society and two other
countries studied. He estimates there would be 10,000 fewer murders, 70,000
fewer rapes, one million fewer motor vehicle thefts. 2.5 million fewer burglaries,
and 10 million fewer larcenies here each year if not for violent T.V. and film
entertainment.
Id. at 35 (quoting Thomas Radecki, Fight Against TV and Movie Violence, USA TODAY,
July 23, 1991, at 10A). Dr. Cosby concludes in her study that "negative television image-
ries of African-Americans instruct African-Americans to hate themselves ... [and] instruct
other ethnic people to dislike African-Americans." Id. at 133.
26. Id. at 133.
27. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68
F.C.C.2d 979 (1978). The FCC also adopted additional regulatory approaches in an effort
to provide opportunities for minorities to participate in the emerging, highly-advanced
telecommunications markets. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Minority Ownership of Cable
Television Facilities, FCC 82-524 (Dec. 22, 1982); In re Commission Policy Regarding the
Advancement of Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, Policy Statement and Proposed Rule
Making, 92 F.C.C.2d 849 (1982); Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Mi-
nority Ownership in Broadcasting, Policy Statement, 48 Fed. Reg. 5943 (1983); In re Imple-
mentation of § 3090) of the Communications Act, Fifth Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd.
5532 (1994), modified by Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10 FCC Rcd. 403 (1995)
(regulations providing bidding opportunities for minorities in particular bands).
28. The FCC's tax certificate program allowed the seller of a broadcast facility to defer
capital gains taxes incurred in a sale to minority-owned or controlled groups. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1982). The Republican-controlled Congress deemed the program problematic, and
consequently abolished it, asserting that the tax code should be colorblind and that the
FCC had improperly administered the program. Pub. L. No. 104-7, 109 Stat. 93 (1995)
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988)); see also House Curbs on Affirmative
Action Could Scuttle Viacom Cable Sale, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1995, at 13; Paul Farhi, House
Rejects Tax Break, Viacom Sale to Minority Group Spurred Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 22,
1995, at Al.
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without regard to stare decisis,29 the Supreme Court in its recent
Adarand decision struck a debilitating blow to the FCC's remaining
minority preference programs.30 These unsettling developments,
when combined with the findings that suggest racial stereotyping con-
tributes to the continued racial discord in this nation, compels a re-
examination of this issue. A failure to resolve this problem will con-
tribute to greater racial polarization. This article proposes shifting the
dialogue away from a "diversity of viewpoint" debate and towards the
development of a race-neutral regulatory framework that strives to
abolish the continued portrayal of inaccurate and inappropriate mi-
nority "stereotyping." In essence, this article suggests that Congress,
the FCC, and the courts must augment their traditional efforts to en-
sure "diversity of viewpoint" with a new focus, and emphasize the
harm that "minority stereotyping" imposes on society and its children.
Part I of this Article is a historical analysis of the underlying pur-
poses and rationales of the laws, rules, regulations, and policies
adopted by the federal government and the courts to ensure "diversity
of viewpoint" in broadcast programming. Part II describes the re-
search findings relating to minority stereotyping, and its debilitating
impact on American society and its children, in the electronic media.
The analysis includes a discussion of why the existing policies and fed-
eral programs have been unsuccessful in eliminating racial degrada-
tion on television and why "equal protection jurisprudence" fails at
achieving this goal. Part III of the Article explores the establishment
of a regulatory framework minimizing the effects of racial stereotyp-
ing through regulatory guidelines for non-minority broadcast owners.
29. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the
majority's decision constituted a departure from the Court's equal protection jurispru-
dence, questioning Justice O'Connor's affirmation that the Court "[did] not depart from
the fabric of the law; [it] restore[d] it." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,
2127 (1995). In assessing whether Justice O'Connor's "pronouncement [was] a faithful ap-
plication of the doctrine of stare decisis," Justice Stevens argued, "[I]t is quite wrong for the
Court to suggest ... that overruling Metro Broadcasting merely restores the status quo
ante, for the law at the time of that decision was entirely open[;] ... [the Adarand] decision
is an unjustified departure from settled law." Id.
30. The Court in Adarand held that "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under
strict scrutiny... [and thus] such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Id. at 2113. "To the
extent that Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with" this holding, the Court overruled it.
Id. Adarand is already producing a negative effect as government agencies revise or aban-
don existing affirmative action programs. See In re Implementation of § 3090) of the Com-
munications Act, Sixth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 136 (1995) (modifying competitive
bidding rules by eliminating racial preferences that raised legal uncertainties in the after-
math of Adarand); see also Ann Devroy, Rule Aiding Minority Firms to End, WASH. POST,
Sept. 22, 1995, at 1.
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This discussion includes an analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence
and a reassessment of the constitutional protections afforded and the
freedoms guaranteed to members of the broadcasting industry. This
Article leaves to others the difficult task of designing a minority pref-
erence program that meets the moving target of "equal protection" as
recently defined by the Supreme Court. 31
I
A Historical Perspective of Broadcast Regulation and
the Quest to Achieve "Diversity"
A. Early Broadcast Regulation
In order to meaningfully eliminate racial stereotyping from tele-
vision broadcasting, one must understand the nature of the media, the
responsibilities of broadcasters, and the rights of the viewing public.
Congress' initial efforts regulating radio communication were unob-
trusive.32 The early 1900's witnessed considerable expansion of com-
mercial broadcasting and with it, confusion and turmoil.33 The
increased use of over-the-air signals brought chaos that ultimately re-
sulted in the passage of the Radio Act of 1927 (1927 Act). 34 The 1927
Act established the Federal Radio Commission and provided the reg-
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM ON
SUPREME COURT'S Adarand Decision (1995) (Justice Department memorandum for distri-
bution to federal agencies purporting to explain the ramifications of Adarand v. Pena); see
also Ann Devroy & Kevin Merida, Justice Department Outlines Standards for Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, June 29, 1995, at A10.
32. See Wireless Ship Act of 1910, ch. 379, 36 Stat. 629 (1910) (requiring certain classes
of ships to be equipped with radio equipment), Radio Act of 1912, ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302
(1912) (Though the Radio Act of 1912 required radio operators to obtain a license from
the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and imposed technical restrictions, it was primarily
designed to comply with U.S. treaty obligations.); Timothy G. Gauger, Comment. The
Constitutionality of the FCC's Use of Race and Sex in the Granting of Broadcasting
Licenses, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 665, 669 (1989); DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULA-
TION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 20-21 (2d ed. 1991).
33. One commentator has noted that the number of applicants for licenses increased
dramatically at the same time the courts limited the regulatory power of the Secretary of
Commerce to selecting "wavelengths for broadcasting," granting him "no power to refuse
license applications ... [or] to place restrictions on frequency, power, or hours of opera-
tion." Gauger, supra note 32, at 669 nn.30-31 (citing Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F.
1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923) and United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. I11.
1926)).
34. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927). Because voluntary measures and market forces
failed to remedy the problems of broadcasting, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoo-
ver attempted to regulate the chaotic airwaves by expanding the Radio Act of 1912. Kurt
A. Wimmer, Deregulation and the Market Failure in Minority Programming: The Socibeco-
nomic Dimensions of Broadcast Reform, 8 COMM/ENT L.J. 329, 421 (1986). Hoover stated
that broadcasting "is probably the only industry of the United States that is unanimously in
favor of having itself regulated." Id. at 420.
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ulatory framework for the emerging broadcasting industry. It embod-
ied, for the. first time, the concept that the airwaves were public
property and that a license would be granted only "as public conven-
ience, interest, or necessity requires."35
When the Communications Act of 1934 was enacted, Congress
granted the newly created agency, the FCC, far broader powers than
its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission. 36 The Communica-
tions Act of 1934 created a public system of permits and licenses gov-
35. The Radio Act of 1927 stated, in relevant part, that it was "intended... to provide
for the use of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals, firms, or corpo-
rations, for limited periods of time, and no such license shall be construed to create any
right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license." Ch. 169, § 1, 44 Stat. 1162
(1927). The Act also provided: "The licensing authority, if public convenience, interest, or
necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any
applicant therefor a station license provided for by this Act " Id. at 1163-66. One com-
mentator found that:
[tihe sponsors of the 1927 Act had in mind a specific rationale underlying the
Federal Radio Commission's allocation of broadcast licenses ... [and in] laying
the groundwork for broadcasting regulation, Congress codified the theory that
the 'scarcity' of broadcasting frequencies required broadcasters to act as 'public
trustees' in exchange for the privilege of frequency use.
Gauger, supra note 32, at 670. As then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover stated in
1925, the ether "is a public medium, and its use must be for public benefit. The use of
radio channel is justified only if there-is public benefit. The dominant element for consid-
eration in the radio field is, and always will be, the great body of the listening public."
Allen S. Hammond, Diversity and Equal Protection in the Marketplace: The Metro Broad-
casting Case in Context, 44 ARK. L. REV. 1063, 1082 n.74 (1991). During the hearing on the
adoption of the 1927 Act, one representative stated, "American thought and American
politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations. For publicity is the
most powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic .... " Id. (quoting 67 CONG. REC.
5557 (1926)); see also Laura A. Petregal, Note, Unfair Treatment of the Fairness Doctrine:
Arkansas AFL-CIO v. FCC, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 875 (1994) (The remarks made by a
sponsor of the Radio Act of 1927 manifest a clear public interest standard: "[L]icenses
should be issued only to those stations whose operation would render a benefit to the
public, are necessary in the public interest standard or would contribute to the develop-
ment of the art." 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1927), quoted in Petregal. supra, at 889).
36. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988), provides in relevant
part:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication
by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of
the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide and world-wide wire and radio
communication service with adequate facilities at.reasonable charges, for the pur-
pose of the national defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and prop-
erty through the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of
securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority hereto-
fore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority with
respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communication,
there is created a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications
Commission," which shall be constituted as hereinafter provided, and which shall
execute and enforce the provisions of the chapter.
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erning commercial broadcasting.3 7 Still, the 1934 Act retained the
theory that the public owned the airwaves,38 and the grant of a license
was limited to broadcasters committed to operating in the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity. ' 39 It was the FCC's recognition of
the "public interest" mandate that prompted the agency to strive for
diversity of ownership, believing that such ownership would ensure
diversity of broadcast programming.'
B. The Regulatory Quest for "Diversity of Viewpoint"
The FCC has consistently, throughout its history, embraced a reg-
ulatory philosophy that "diversification of ownership will broaden the
range of programming available to the broadcast audience."41 The
FCC has maintained that diverse programming is a constitutionally
37. See id.
38. Compare Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1083 (1934), codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1982), with the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 144 Stat. 1162
(1927). Professor Hammond contends:
Congress recognized that a decision to vest an absolute speech right in the owner
of the technology (broadcasting) would result in denying the right of electronic
speech to the substantial majority of the American public. Recognizing that the
broadcast licensee would have control of a powerful technology relying on a
scarce public resource, Congress opted to vest only a portion of the speech right
in the broadcaster, reserving to the public the larger interest and speech right via
access and diversity.
Hammond, supra note 35, at 1081. Professor Neal Devins explains that the concepts of
"public interest" and "diversity" were embraced as early as 1929 by the Federal Radio
Commission when it "[held] that a radio station's public trustee responsibilities included an
affirmative obligation to make certain that a diversity of religious, political, social, and
economic viewpoints 'find their way into the market of ideas."' Devins, supra note 21, at
153 n.38 (quoting Mayflower Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, rev'd on other grounds,
37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1929), and cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930)).
39. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943); see also id. at 215-16 (determining
that the important factor in allocating licenses is whether the applicant for a broadcast
license will serve the public interest); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138
n.2 (1940) (explaining that the FCC must evaluate which broadcaster will best serve the
public interest).
40. See Ellen L. Triebold, Constitutional Law-The Court Meets Halfway on Affirma-
tive Action: Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 16 J. CORP.
L. 653, 655 (1991). The FCC's "public interest" efforts have been affirmed by the Supreme
Court as a clearly stated mandate of the Communications Act of 1934: "Congress moved
under the widespread fear that in the absence of governmental control the public interest
might be subordinated to monopolist domination in the broadcast field." FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
41. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 570 (1990) overruled in part by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), The emphasis on ownership
has been justified by the notion that "ownership carries with it the power to select, to edit,
and to choose the methods, manner and emphasis of presentation, all of which are a critical
aspect of the Commission's concern with public interest." Id. at 571 n.16 (quoting In re
Amendment of Sections, 73.34, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report
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guaranteed right of the television viewing audience.42 Moreover, the
First Amendment arguably enshrouds the FCC's "public interest"
mandate with an obligation to provide viewers with the "widest possi-
ble dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources.
' 43
The application of the FCC's policy resulted in the promulgation
of policy statements and rules calculated to minimize media concen-
tration.' In the early 1940s, the Commission prohibited any person
from operating more than one television and radio station in the same
community.4 During the 1960s, the FCC prohibited common owner-
ship of two AM or FM stations in the same broadcast service areas.46
By the 1970s, the Commission limited media concentration in specific
markets,47 regional concentration,48 and cross-ownership of competi-
tive media.49 In the 1980s, the Commission imposed limitations on
group ownership in general. 50
and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1050 (1975)). Regarding the need for diversity, one commen-
tator argues:
The concern for diversity has a primacy among [F]irst [Almendment principles,
because the form of democratic self-government on which the United States is
based requires the presentation of diverse viewpoints. 'The [F]irst [Almendment
presupposes that the right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many
this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all.'
Wimmer, supra note 34, at 430 n.543 (quoting Judge Learned Hand in United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), affid, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
42. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
43. Id. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail .... ").
44. Many commentators disapprove of the deregulatory approach espoused by former
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler. The liberalization of ownership restrictions would clearly
lead to greater control of broadcast media in fewer hands. See generally Wimmer, supra
note 34, at 427-28 ("The broadcast industry is already characterized by great concentration.
About 72 percent of commercial stations are held by group owners. Of 748 television
stations, 495 are owned by 165 entities, an average of three each.") (citations omitted).
45. Multiple Ownership of Standard Broadcast Stations, 8 Fed. Reg. 16,065 (1943); see
also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 193 (1943).
46. Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 45 F.C.C. 1476 (1964).
47. See In re Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission Rules,
First Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 306 (1970) modified by Memorandum and Order, 28
F.C.C.2d 662 (1971).
48. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a)(2) (1979).
49. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.501(a) (1977) 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(c), .240(c), .636(c) (1979).
50. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(b), .24(a), .636 (1981). But see Paul Farhi, Hearst-Case Sce-
nario: Curbs on Media Moguls May Ease, WASH. POST, July 19, 1995, at Al.
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The FCC's interpretation of its "public interest" mandate, as it
relates to First Amendment requirements, has been sanctioned by the
courts:
The promotion of diverse sources of information through' diversifi-
cation of media ownership is thus well established as an integral
part of the Commission's public interest mandate . . . . The
Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions the connection
between diversity of ownership and the diversity of ideas and ex-
pression that is the basis of the First Amendment.5'
The "diversity of viewpoint" as a public interest policy was also
embraced by Congress. In 1959, Congress enacted legislation that
sought to ensure broadcasters would afford "reasonable opportunity
for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public impor-
tance. ' 52 Moreover, legislation enacted more than two decades later,
which authorized the FCC's use of an expedited licensing process, in-
cluded language directing the Commission to continue its vigilance in
preserving diversity of programming.53
51. Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Professor Hammond also
notes that the Supreme Court has recognized congressional authority pursuant to the First
Amendment to mandate diversity:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio [and other
forms of broadcast] and their collective right to have the medium function con-
sistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment and '[i]t is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters which is para-
mount'. ... Congress may... seek to assure that the public receives through this
medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance
that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely
in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting stations.
Hammond, supra note 35, at 1082 (quoting Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 566
(1990) (citations omitted).
52. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1988). The obligation of broadcasters "to encourage and imple-
ment the broadcast of all sides of controversial public issues" was recognized by the FCC
in 1949. Devins, supra note 21, at 153 (quoting Editorializing by Broadcast Licenses, Re-
port of the Commission, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949)). This affirmative obligation, known as the
"fairness doctrine," required the adequate coverage of public issues and the provision of
opposing viewpoints. Id.
53. In 1981, Congress amended § 309(i) of the Communications Act of 1934 and
granted the FCC the authority to award broadcast licenses by lottery. 33 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 1242, 95 Stat. 736, 739-37 (1981) (relating
to both television and radio broadcasting). In adopting this new lottery system, the House
Conference Report confirmed that the resulting FCC licensing action was to "enhanc[e]
diversity through such structural means [to] broaden the nature and type of information
and programming disseminated to the public." H.R. CONF. Rm'. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 43, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2287.
Congress was intensely interested in prohibiting cross-ownership. In July 1985,
hearings were held to "underline, underscore, and emphasize to people the im-
portance of concentration and cross-ownership." Later that year, language was
included in a conference report and a letter was sent to the FCC by its oversight
committee "that the cross-ownership rules are vitally important" and that the
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Initially, the FCC's diversity policy focused on minimizing con-
centration of broadcast media ownership as the primary means of en-
suring dissemination of diverse viewpoints. However, as a result of
the racial disturbances of the late 1960s54 and the findings of the Ker-
ner Commission, the FCC initiated race-neutral regulatory policies
that sought to ensure the inclusion of minority viewpoints in broadcast
media. 5 The policies were designed to encourage broadcasters to
hire minorities.
Unfortunately, ten years later it became painfully clear that the
FCC's minority employment and ascertainment programs were unable
to increase minority representation in the broadcasting industry. 6 In
1977, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission released a study that tied the
importance of stereotypical portrayals of minorities on television to
the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of the viewing public. The study
Commission should review "with greater scrutiny" requests for waivers to the
cross-ownership ban.
Devins, supra note 21, at 166 n.117 (quoting Media Mergers and Takeovers: The FCC and
the Public Interest, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985); letter from House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Mark S.
Fowler (Nov. 13, 1985), reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S65 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1988)).
54. See discussion supra note 2.
55. Citing the findings of the Kerner Report, the FCC in 1968 implemented regula-
tions to prohibit racial discrimination in broadcast employment. See In re Petition for Rule
Making to Require Broadcast Licensees to Show Nondiscrimination in Their Employment
Practices, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969) (adopting rules and reporting require-
ment to assure equal opportunity); In re Nondiscrimination in the Employment Policies
and Practices of Broadcast Licensees, Report and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 226, 231 (1976)
(adopting a model equal employment opportunity (EEO) program). In 1976, the Commis-
sion promulgated a rule that required licensees to communicate with minority and other
groups in the community in order to ascertain issues of particular importance. See In re
Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, First Report and Order,
57 F.C.C.2d 418, 442-44 (1976). The "ascertainment" regulations sought to assist the licen-
see in providing programming that better reflected the interest of the minority community.
See id. In 1960, the Commission included "minority groups" as one of several groups
whose programming needs were to be met by television licensees in order to meet their
public interest responsibilities. See Enbanc Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of
Policy, 44 F.C.C.2d 2303, 2314 (1960).
56. Akousa B. Evans concludes that both the race-neutral policies of the FCC and the
marketplace failed to increase minority representation in the broadcasting industry. Ev-
ans, supra note 14, at 386. He argues: "Six years after the FCC's EEO policies were imple-
mented, African-Americans and other minorities still held a small percentage of
management jobs in the broadcast industry. In 1977,... while 64.9% of the management
positions at forty selected television stations were held by white males, only 5.2% and




concluded that these conditions had distinctly impacted race relations
in American society. 7 The study further stated:
Research is limited regarding the attitudes which blacks develop to-
ward themselves as a result of their relative heavy television viewing
behavior. Dr. Bradley Greenberg, who has done extensive research
on blacks in television, found that black children identify with black
television characters and rate them highly in handsomeness, friend-
liness, and strength. Other questions must be answered by further
research. What is the impact on black children of seeing black
adults portrayed so frequently as police officers, as criminals, and in
a variety of service roles? What is the impact on black girls who see
adult black wom[e]n who are mostly unemployed and who are fre-
quently prostitutes? What is the effect on children of other minority
groups who rarely see adults of their own ethnic background por-
trayed on television at all?58
The study further concluded that:
Greenberg's research on the impact of television's portrayal of
blacks on white viewers reveals that white children are more likely
than black children to learn about the other race from television.
Forty percent of the white children attributed their knowledge about
how blacks look, talk, and dress to television. Those white -children
who had the least opportunity to interact with blacks were most
likely to believe that television portrayals of blacks were realistic. 59
Therefore, neither the FCC's race-neutral policies nor the private
marketplace were addressing the problems of minority under-repre-
sentation and the concomitant stereotyping. In an effort to confront
minority under-representation, the Commission established the Mi-
nority Ownership Task Force (MOTF) as an advisory group. In 1978,
the MOTF issued a report that concluded:
Acute under-representation of minorities among the owners of
broadcast properties is troublesome in that it is the licensee who is
ultimately responsible for identifying and serving the needs and in-
terests of his audience. Unless minorities are encouraged to enter
the mainstream of the commercial broadcasting business, a substan-
tial proportion of our citizenry will remain underserved, and the
larger non-minority audience will be deprived of the views of
minorities.60
57. WINDOW DRESSING, supra note 3, at 47.
58. Id. at 46 (citing Bradley S. Greenberg, Children's Reactions to TV Blacks, JOUR-
NALISM Q., Spring 1972, at 10).
59. Id. at 46 (citing Bradley S. Greenberg, Children's Reaction to TV Blacks, JOUR-
NALISM Q., Spring 1972, at 11) (emphasis added).
60. FEDERAL COMMUNICATION COMMISSION'S MINORITY OWNERSHIP TASK FORCE,
MINORITY OWNERSHIP REPORT (1978) [hereinafter MOTF REPORT], quoted in Statement
of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979, 981 (1978). In
April of 1977, the FCC convened a conference to analyze the reasons for the continued
under-representation of minority broadcasting owners. Evans, supra note 14, at 388. The
participants identified the problem as the result of "years of racial discrimination [that]
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Immediately after the issuance of the MOTF Report, the FCC an-
nounced two new policy initiatives:61 (1) minority preferences in tax
certificates, 62 and (2) the distress sales program.63 The FCC justified
the new regulatory approach by resorting to its time-honored policy of
created barriers," including lack of capital, inability to obtain financing, and inability to
access the "Old Boy Network." Id.
61. Professor Wendy M. Rogovin proffers that the new FCC initiatives were the conse-
quence of "some fifteen years of studies conducted by Congress and various interest
groups." See Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public Interest: On
Creating a Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 CAm. U. L.
REV. 51 (1992). One article explains that the FCC's 1978 policy initiatives grew out of both
the MOTF Report and a petition filed with the Commission urging the need to implement
minority ownership policies. Lorna Veraldi & Stuart A. Shorestein, Gender Preferences, 45
FED. COMM. L.J. 219 (1993). The authors also note that "the Court of Appeals in TV 9 v.
FCC" ruled in 1974 "that minority ownership should be afforded merit in comparative
hearings." Id. at 222.
62. Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d
979, 983 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Minority Policy Statement]. The tax certificate program
provides for deferral of capital gains taxation. Id. at 983 n.19. Congress initially enacted
the tax provision to encourage separate ownership of competing broadcast companies. Id.
Those broadcasters owning two or more competing properties before the enactment of the
legislation were exempt under a grandfather clause. Id. (citation omitted). Congress pro-
vided the Commission with the authority to issue a certificate that treats the sale of a
broadcast property as a deferred capital gain if the sale allows the Commission to institute
a new policy or to implement a policy change relating to the ownership of broadcast sta-
tions. 28 U.S.C. § 1071 (1988). Under the FCC's tax certificate policy, a broadcaster quali-
fied for a deferred capital gain if it sold a broadcast facility to a business entity with at least
fifty percent minority ownership. In re Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of
Minority Ownership in Broadcasting, Policy Statement and Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, 853 (1982). In 1995, Congress abolished this minority preference
program in response to the announced purchase of Viacom by a minority entrepreneur.
See discussion supra note 40.
63. 1978 Minority Policy Statement, supra note 62, at 983. The "distress sale" policy
allows a broadcaster whose license has been designated for a revocation hearing, or whose
renewal application has been designated for a hearing, to assign the license to an FCC-
approved minority enterprise at a "distress sale" price. Id. As of 1991, "[o]nly thirty-eight
distress sales [had] been approved by the FCC since their inception in 1978, and only thir-
teen [had] been approved in the [preceding] nine years," which constitutes "a minute frac-
tion of the total number of broadcast stations transferred during those same years." Mary
Tabor, Encouraging "Those Who Would Speak Out with a Fresh Voice" Through the Fed-
eral Communication Commission's Minority Ownership Policies, 76 IOWA L. REV. 609, 620
(1991). The FCC, based on the "primary objective of maximum diversification of owner-
ship," also began to consider the race and ethnicity of applicants in "afford[ing] compara-
tive merit to applicants for construction permits where minority owners were to participate
in the operation of the station." 1978 Minority Policy Statement, supra note 62, at 982. In
a 1965 policy statement, the FCC established two primary factors it would use to evaluate
competing applicants for a broadcasting frequency: (1) "the best practicable service to the
public," and (2) "a maximum of diffusion of control of the media of mass communica-
tions." Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, Public Notice, 1 F.C.C.2d
393, 394 (1965), discussed in Gauger, supra note 32, at 671. One commentator has ob-
served that the 1965 Policy Statement excluded the relevance of an applicants' race, sex,
ethnicity, or gender, but the D.C. Circuit, in TV 9 v. FCC, mandated that the FCC consider
these factors. Gauger, supra note 32, at 671.
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acting in the "public interest"; the FCC argued that "the views of ra-
cial minorities continue[d] to be inadequately represented in the
broadcast media,"'  and that the failure of the airwaves to reflect the
opinions of racial minorities was "detrimental" to the viewing and lis-
tening public as a whole.65 The FCC determined that the "legitimate
public interest objective" of program diversity could be furthered
through minority ownership of broadcast facilities.66
The concept that a "nexus" exists between minority ownership
and minority programming originated with TV 9, Inc. v. FCC.6 7 When
the Commission adopted the "nexus" theory, the resulting minority
preference programs found support in Congress68 and the courts. 69
64. 1978 Minority Policy Statement, supra note 62, at 980.
65. Id. at 980-81. The Commission, clothing its new regulatory policy with a "public
interest" mantle, stated that "adequate representation of minority viewpoints in program-
ming serves not only the needs and interest of the minority community but also enriches
and educates the non-minority audience." Id.
66. Id. at 981.
67. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). The court in that
decision considered the FCC's refusal to award comparative merit to a corporate applicant
with black investors living in the relevant community. Id. at 935-36. The FCC claimed that
"[b]lack ownership [could not] and should not be an independent comparative factor,"
asserting that the Communications Act was "color blind.". Id. The court rejected the Com-
mission's argument, asserting that the Constitution permits "a view of our developing na-
tional life which accords merits to Black participation" and that "when minority ownership
is likely to increase diversity of content, especially of opinion and viewpoint, merit should
be awarded." Id. at 936, 939. The court concluded that the Commission's "primary objec-
tive" of diversification was consistent with awarding merit to minority applicants and,
moreover, that the Commission should grant merit for Black ownership and participation
if there is a "reasonable expectation" that such involvement will produce a public interest
benefit. Id. at 938.
In a later decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that
the FCC erred in failing to grant a black man any "weight" for his minority status in the
technical requirement phase of a comparative hearing. Garett v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1056, 1063
(D.C. Cir. 1975), discussed in Gauger, supra note 32, at 674-78. The court "characterized
its earlier TV 9 opinion as meaning that 'black ownership and participation together are
themselves likely to bring about programming that is responsive to the needs of the black
citizenry' and 'that "reasonable expectation," without "advance demonstration," [of a pub-
lic interest benefit from increased minority ownership] gives them relevance."' Gauger,
supra note 32, at 675 (quoting Garett, 513 F.2d at 1063 (quoting TV 9, 495 F.2d at 937-38)).
68. See H.R. REP. No. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2261. Congress also noted that "[tihe nexus between diversity of media ownership and
diversity of programming sources has been respectfully recognized by both the Commis-.
sion and the courts." Id. at 40.
69. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976); Steele v. FCC, 770
F.2d 1192, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Wald, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the promotion of
diverse sources of information through diversification of ownership is a well established
public interest mandate). In NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, the Supreme Court in-
quired as to what authority, if any, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had to prohibit
employment discrimination by regulated utilities. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425
U.S. at 670. In finding such authority lacking, the Court distinguished the FPC's role in
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Others, however, questioned the legal and factual validity of the FCC
minority ownership policies.70 The arguments and suppositions of
both the proponents and opponents of the FCC's programs became
the subject of heated debate between the majority and dissenting
opinions in the controversial Supreme Court decision Metro Broad-
casting v. FCC.7
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Metro Broadcasting,
held that enhancing broadcast diversity constitutes an important gov-
ernmental objective.72 In sanctioning the assumption that expanding
ensuring diverse programming from that of the FCC. Id. The Court observed that the
FCC's policies "can be justified as necessary to enable the FCC to satisfy its obligation
under the Communications Act of 1934... to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly
reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups." Id. at 670 n.7.
70. The premise that minority ownership would result in programming unobtainable
from the existing non-minority-broadcasting industry was often challenged. The D.C.
Court of Appeals, in Steele, rebuffed such a notion:
The minority preference rests on the assumption that first, membership in an eth-
nic minority causes members of that minority to have distinct tastes and perspec-
tives and, second, that these differences will consciously or unconsciously be
reflected in distinctive editorial and entertainment programming. The validity of
the first of these assumptions is not obvious on its face.... Indeed, to make such
an assumption concerning an individual's taste and viewpoint would seem to us as
mere indulgence in the most simplistic kind of ethnic stereotyping .... With re-
spect to the second assumption .... [t]o Suggest that these dubious ethnically-
determined tastes will outweigh the economic imperative of what the audience
wants to hear ... strikes us as more than a little implausible.
770 F.2d at 1198-99.
During the Reagan Administration, the FCC abandoned its support of the minority
ownership efforts. A 1980 report by the Commission claimed that ownership restrictions
had produced minimal public benefit and that therefore no causal connection existed be-
tween the programs and the goals of competition and diverse viewpoints. See Andrea L.
Johnson, Redefining Diversity in Telecommunications: Uniform Regulatory Framework for
Mass Communications, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 87, 97 (1992) (citations omitted).
71. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). At question in Metro Broadcasting was the FCC's minority
enhancements and distress sale policies. Separate proceedings challenging the minority
ownership programs were consolidated for consideration by the Court. In Winter Park
Communications v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a non-minority company sought
review of an FCC decision granting a new license to Rainbow Broadcasting, a minority-
owned firm. The D.C. Circuit had previously affirmed the FCC determination that Rain-
bow's minority ownership status substantially outweighed the qualifications of Metro
Broadcasting. Id. at 349. Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902
(D.C. Cir. 1989), decided by another panel of the same circuit, held improper the FCC's
order approving Faith Center, Inc.'s distress sale of its television license to a minority firm.
The court concluded that the FCC's actions violated Shurberg's equal protection rights
under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 903. The Supreme Court affirmed the Winter Park
decision and reversed Shurberg.
72. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 568. Justice Brennan argued that the benefits of
broadcast diversity were not confined to minority groups but instead ,"redound to all mem-
bers of the viewing and listening audience." Id. In reaching this conclusion, the majority
relied on several major cases on broadcast media and the First Amendment: FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984) (finding a fiduciary obligation imposed
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"minority ownership of broadcast outlets will, in the aggregate, result
in greater broadcast diversity," the majority deferred to the fact-find-
ing of Congress and to the expertise of the FCC.73 And while the
Court found no direct correlation between minority ownership and
enhanced diversity of viewpoint, the Court found it reasonable to en-
visage that "[the] broadcasting industry with representative minority
participation will produce more variation and diversity than will one
whose ownership is drawn from a single racially and ethnically homo-
geneous group. 74
Writing for the dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority
for failing to determine "how one would define or measure a particu-
lar viewpoint that might be associated with race."'75 She faulted the
FCC for having essentially identified "what constitutes a 'Black view-
point,' an 'Asian viewpoint,' an 'Arab viewpoint,' and so on, ' 76 argu-
ing that "an individual's tastes, beliefs, and abilities should be assessed
on their own merits," as opposed to "categorizing that individual as a
member of a racial group presumed to think and behave in a particu-
lar way." 77
on broadcasters by the Communications Act); CBS v. Democratic National Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 122 (1973) (the FCC's "public interest" standard augments important First
Amendment requirements); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
(the authority to regulate broadcasters is derived from the scarcity of the airwave frequen-
cies); and NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943) (broadcasting, unlike other me-
dia, may be regulated by the government). Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566-67.
73. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579. In so holding, the Court deferred to the
FCC's conclusion that a nexus existed between minority ownership and the inclusion of
minority views in programming. Id.
74. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579. Professor Douglas 0. Linder suggests that:
While never explicitly stated, the "broadcast diversity" that Justice Brennan had
in mind must concern information about racial issues .... Adding to the under-
represented minority voices may facilitate understanding, vent frustration and un-
dermine racial stereotypes-all consequences of a 'robust exchange of ideas' on
racial issues. It is apparent from the FCC's policies that the "broadcast diversity"
the agency wanted to increase related to racial issues, rather than public issues
generally.
Douglas 0. Linder, Review of Affirmative Action After Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: The
Solution Almost Nobody Wanted, 59 UMKC L. REV. 293. 309 (1991). Professor Julian N.
Eule, in a thoughtful article, analyzes Metro Broadcasting solely from a First Amendment
perspective. Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting,
1990 Sup. CT. REV. 105. Noting that the world of television is "largely a white one," he
suggests that the Court in Metro Broadcasting tacitly approved a concept that allowed gov-
ernment to "tone down or turn up the volume of particular speakers" in order to ensure
speaker diversity. Id. at 122, 124, 127.
75. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 614 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 615.
77. Id. at 618 (quoting Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1985), judgment
vacated pending en banc rehearing). Professor Linder observes that the Court in Metro
Broadcasting basically disagreed about "racial generalizations." Linder, supra note 74, at
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To the degree it was interpreted to require an intermediate level
of scrutiny for congressionally mandated minority preference pro-
grams, Metro Broadcasting has been overruled: Adarand v. Pena held
that congressional programs, like state and local programs, shall be
subject to strict scrutiny.78 This requirement means that Congress and
the FCC must now show statistical evidence of past discrimination,
demonstrating a compelling governmental interest, and that any pro-
gram established must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest.79 In
sum, the Court in Adarand concluded that "Metro Broadcasting was
... a significant departure from much of what had come before it" and
as such, thought that "well-settled legal principles pointed toward a
conclusion different from the one reached in Metro Broadcasting.
8 °
With the new conservative majority on the Supreme Court, and
the revised "equal protection" standards as derived in Adarand, the
FCC must revise its minority ownership policies to achieve its goal of
ensuring "diversity of viewpoint." More importantly, the FCC must
also acknowledge the continued practice of racial stereotyping in tele-
vision broadcasting, and adopt a regulatory regime that addresses the
problems associated with these media distortions more specifically. A
recent study conducted by an Advisory Committee to the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission concluded:
The news media has tremendous influence on the attitudes of view-
ers and readers regarding race relations in this country. The unfair
portrayal of minorities in the electronic and print media has pro-
duced negative self-images of people of color, and it has bestowed
upon white people an undeserved and destructive image of
superiority.8 1
314. He states, "The dissenters argued that 'essential equal protection principles' flatly
'prohibit racial generalizations."' Id. at 314 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 619
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)). "The majority, on the other hand, condemned what it called
'impermissible stereotyping,' but approved 'predictive judgments' about the link between
race and behavior." Id. at 314-15 (quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 579.
78. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995). By contrast,
Justice Stevens argued in dissent that the "fostering" of diversity, determined in Metro
Broadcasting to constitute a compelling governmental objective, was not inconsistent with
the Court's holding in Adarand. Id. at 2127. "[I]ndeed, the question is not remotely
presented in this case-and I do not take the Court's opinion to diminish that aspect of our
decision in Metro Broadcasting." Id. at 2127-28. Justice Stevens alluded to Metro Broad-
casting as the genesis for the proposition that achieving diversity constitutes a compelling
government interest. Id. at 2127. It was, however, Justice Powell in Regents of the Univ. of
CaL. v. Bakke that found a compelling interest in the University's goal of attaining a diverse
student body because of the First Amendment interests involved. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
79. Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2113.
80. Id. at 2113-16.
81. MINNESOTA ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STEREO-
TYPING OF MINORITIES BY THE NEWS MEDIA IN MINNESOTA 35 (1993) [hereinafter
1996]
The continued use by the media of "negative self-images," the
study explains, substantially impedes any efforts toward eliminating
racial discord.8 2 Acknowledging that these issues have been identified
and studied for almost three decades, the Advisory Committee pro-
posed numerous solutions.83 Most important, however, the Advisory
Committee concluded with a warning to the broadcast industry,'
which it described as having the "high[est] level of unrestricted" liber-
ties in the world:
With that freedom goes the obligation not to use that freedom to
limit the freedom, liberty, or advancement opportunity of any ra-
cial, ethnic, or religious segment of the community. No differently
from individual libel cases, group libel (whether intentional or not)
is destructive of a free press.85
One legal commentator notes in his discussion of the stereotypi-
cal portrayals of minorities on network programming:
The paucity of minority viewpoints over the airwaves is detrimental
... [but negative] stereotyping seems a worse affront to equal respect
than a mere failure to afford sufficient opportunities for self-expres-
sion. Also, the combination of negative stereotypes and gross
under-representation of minority viewpoints skews the information
presented to the broadcast audience as a whole in a way that fosters
and perpetuates prejudices against minorities.
STEREOTYPING OF MINORITIES] (emphasis added). The study quoted the testimony of
Robert Entman, a professor of journalism at Northwestern University:
While the roots of racism are varied and deep, there is a surprising source of
messages that daily stimulate racial tensions: local television news .... Blacks
generally look more threatening than whites in crime stories and they seem more
demanding and self serving in political stories.... Many of the racial messages on
local news are difficult to change, since they reflect a part ... of urban reality ....
It's not that blacks and white are treated differently in every respect; many ...
measurements [are] in balance. But overall, local television presents viewers with
an accumulation of negative imagery of African-Americans. By denying the his-
torical context of high crime rates and political demands among blacks-the resi-
due of long years of discrimination-television contributes to a racism that is
more subtle than old-fashioned bigotry, but just as destructive, especially in to-
day's tense economic political climate.
Id. at 1.
82. The study found that stereotyping can adversely impact both minority and major-
ity communities because it (1) reinforces negative stereotypes that impede equal opportu-
nities for minorities, (2) implies that minorities make more negative contributions to the
community than positive ones and therefore alienates and polarizes the minority commu-
nity from the majority community, (3) impacts the potential role models for minority
youth, (4) obstructs the development of self-esteem among minorities, and (5) polarizes
racial and ethnic minority. Id.
83. It recommended such actions as recruiting and hiring people of color, and support-
ing minority-owned broadcasting facilities with government monies through advertising.
Id. at 37-38.
84. The study described the television and print media as basically "white owned and
operated." Id. at 38.
85. Id. at 37.
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Affording a fair opportunity for self-expression to those who
have been portrayed as inferiors should rank as a priority for any-
one who interprets free speech as entailing the equal liberty
principle. 6
In pursuing its quest to ensure diversity of viewpoints, the FCC
has throughout its history focused on minimizing concentration of
ownership of the airwaves.87 When the FCC found itself confronted
with'racial unrest, under-representation, and stereotyping, it sought to
combat the problems by defining them in terms most familiar to its
"public interest" standards. The notion that the Commission's obliga-
tion to control media concentration, and thus provide television view-
ers with the "widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse '88 sources, provided a regulatory framework that was familiar
to and accepted by the courts and Congress. The FCC sought to at-
tack minority under-representation and stereotypical portrayals by di-
luting the control of white males over media programming. The
Commission initially attempted to impact media concentration by pro-
moting minority hiring, and then by attempting to increase minority
ownership of broadcast properties.
Unfortunately, the FCC's "concentration" concept raises, equal
protection implications that face new and undetermined challenges.
Meanwhile, the harmful effects of racial stereotyping in television me-
dia continue-unchallenged and unabated.
II
The Impact of Racial Stereotyping and the
Ineffectiveness of Current Regulatory Policy
Numerous commentators believe that the electronic media has
the power to influence and thus define the cultural, political, and so-
86. Michel Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 626 (emphasis added). Social scientist J. L.
Dates makes the following observations:
Television of the 1990s, as a purveyor of shared cultural values, must deal with
relevant issues, and present contemporary concepts and stories characteristic of
American's multicultural, multiethnic society, and do so with a balance view
rather than a one-sided and dominant culture-controlled one.... It is my opinion
that the infusion of authentic, African-American controlled images into main-
stream popular culture, particularly television, could help all Americans better
understand themselves.
Jannette L. Dates, Commercial Television 323, in JANNETrE L. DATES & WILLIAM BAR-
LOW (EDS.), SPLIT IMAGE, AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA (1993).
87. The Commission has always operated on the principle that "diversification of own-
ership will broaden the range of programming available to the broadcast audience." Metro
Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547.
88. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
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cial mores of our society.89 It is widely acknowledged that our tele-
communications regulation could be an effective tool in achieving
racial equality in this country.9 These factors necessitate a compre-
hensive reassessment of the effectiveness of current television media
policies in the elimination of minority stereotyping from our nation's
airwaves.91 The escalated intensity of racial discord, and the persis-
tent affirmation of negative imagery of minorities, compels a re-evalu-
ation of the FCC's constitutionally-sanctioned efforts to ensure
"diversity of viewpoint."92
89. See, e.g., Paula M. Poindexter & Carolyn A. Stroman, Blacks and Television: A
Review of the Research Literature, 25 J. BROADCASTING 103, 103 (1981) ("Ninety-eight
percent of all U.S. homes have television sets; 49 percent have more than one set.... The
average home watches television over six hours a day [and] two-thirds of the U.S. public
relies on television most as its source of news."); Carolyn A. Stroman, Television's Role in
the Socialization of African American Children and Adolescents, 60 J. NEGRO EDUC. 314,
314-15 (1991) ("[I]t is television's ability to transmit the values of the culture that makes
it-together with the family, church, peers. school, and other community-based institu-
tions-such a powerful socializing agent.").
90. See, e.g., Wimmer, supra note 34:
Broadcasting shapes societal values and opinions to a degree unrivaled by other
communications media, and has a pervasive influence on the lives of Ameri-
cans .... [Ilts impact on racial stratification cannot be overlooked, as the social
problem of inequality continues despite gains in the social position of minorities
over the past decades.
... Communications regulation has tremendous potential for facilitating equality
in race relations, and this role justifies careful consideration of changes in regula-
tory policy.
Id. at 331, 334 (citations omitted).
91. Professor Allen Hammond observes that:
In May of 1978, the FCC concluded that the views of minorities remained inade-
quately represented and that the inadequacy adversely affected the public's right
to diversity .... Whether one examines recent commentary on media stories in-
volving race, portrayals of minorities in prime time television, or recent television
programs ... the majority-owned media and press are the object of continued and
often withering criticism regarding their failure to portray blacks and other mi-
norities fairly.
Hammond, supra note 35, at 1084-85 (citations omitted).
92. One commentator suggests that the potential value and role that television broad-
casting could play in the lives of Americans in general, and minority children in particular,
requires a regulatory approach:
The electronic media have the capacity to ease societal stratification indirectly.
Although media do not confer economic benefits, they can alter modes of social
interaction that limit proximity between races and close opportunities to minori-
ties. Changing the discriminatory nature of social attitudes is critical. Once a
population has been a target of discrimination, it is confined to certain roles and
is denied access to scarce resources. Modern mass communications have the ca-
pability of producing 'a voluntary change in attitude or action' of an audience.
This potential could have marked effects in the socialization of children, who are
often exposed to television's stereotypical portrayals during ages when they are
developing conceptions of social inequality. If this capability is used effectively to
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A. The Sociological Findings of the Effects of Televised Racial
Stereotyping
The social science literature clearly demonstrates the overwhelm-
ing presence of television viewing in the average American home. 3
Moreover, research suggests that children, particularly black children,
are by far the largest television viewers.
Children still devote the greatest proportion of their leisure time to
television. In fact, many spend more time watching television than
in the classroom. Children in the first year of the study reported
viewing an average of 31.2 hours per week; the mean viewing fre-
quency in Year 2 was 28.3 hour per week, and in Year 3, 29.4
hours.... Race clearly is a major determinant of children's televi-
sion-viewing. Black subjects watched nearly twice as much televi-
sion as White subjects in all 3 years .... 94
This trend toward greater viewing of television by minorities was
reported as early as 1963 by G.A. Steiner,95 and has consistently been
reaffirmed by research conducted in the last several decades.96 More
importantly, this tendency toward greater exposure to television in
early childhood has been identified as an important factor in the so-
cialization of minority children. 97
It is the use of television in the social development of children
that underscores the significance of television to black audiences and
change the mindset of citizens predisposed to discriminatory attitudes, racial
stratification could be decreased.
Wimmer, supra note 34, at 397.
93. A 1986 Nielsen survey indicated that Blacks watch 10 percent more television than
Whites. Stevina U. Evuleocha & Steve D. Ugbah, Stereotypes, Counter-stereotypes, and
Black Television Images in the 1990s, 13 W. J. OF BLACK STUD. 197, 198 (1989). Moreover,
the authors contend that "by the time the average child has graduated from high school,
he/she would have viewed approximately 22,000 hours of TV. Since a significant percent-
age of this 22,000 hours of viewing show Blacks in a negative and distorted light, it is safe
to assume that TV seeks to perpetuate a false sense of White superiority and a false sense
of inferiority on the part of Blacks." Id.
94. Jane Tangney & Seymour Feshbach, Children's Television-Viewing Frequency: In-
dividual Differences and Demographic Correlates, 14 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOL.
BULL. 145, 149 (1988).
95. GARY A. STEINER, THE PEOPLE LOOK AT TELEVISION (1963).
96. See Poindexter & Stroman, supra note 89, at 108 ("blacks are among the heaviest
consumers of television"); Comstock & Cobbey, Television and the Children of Ethnic Mi-
norities, J. COMM., Winter 1979, 104, 105 ("Ethnic minority children have a distinctive ori-
entation toward television and other mass media."); William H. Anderson Jr. & Bishetta
M. Williams, TV and the Black Child: What Black Children Say About the Shows They
Watch, J. BLACK PSYCHOL., Feb. 1983, 27, 28 ("[B]lack children are more profoundly influ-
enced as a result of greater exposure to TV.").
97. Poindexter & Stroman, citing the Greenberg and Akin study of minority fourth-,
sixth-, and eighth-graders, state that "black youngsters actually watched television so they
could learn how different people behave, talk, dress and look. Black children were signifi-
cantly more likely than white children to say they watched television for this purpose."
Poindexter & Stroman, supra note 89, at 115.
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underlies the great influence of television over time.98 Professor
Stroman explains:
There are compelling reasons to believe that television's socializing
effects may be greater for African American children. One reason
is that the amount of time Black children spend watching television
is phenomenal. Studies indicate that for some African American
children weekly television viewing exceeds their parents' 40-hour
work week. 99
Children are more vulnerable to media images because they lack
real world experience and therefore lack the necessary basis for com-
parison. 10 0 What is disturbing is the empirical data which confirms
that black children use television to acquire values, beliefs, concepts,
attitudes, and basic socialization patterns. 101 These findings suggest
that further examination and analysis is needed to determine the ef-
fect of the media images and messages upon children in general, and
African-American children in particular. 10 2
Social scientists have long criticized television's impact on chil-
dren. Professor Stroman explains that since the introduction of televi-
98. G. COMSTOCK ET AL., TELEVISION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1978) (television is
instrumental as a source of vicarious socialization for children that competes with other
socializing agents to provide role models and information that affect children's attitudes,
beliefs, and behavior).
99. Stroman, supra note 89, at 315. Much of the research literature contends that this
magnitude of television viewing is the consequence of the economic and social deprivation
of the African American family. See W.H. Anderson, Jr. & B.M. Williams, TV and the
Black Child: What Black Children Say About the Shows They Watch, 9 J. BLACK PSYCHOL.
2 (1983) ("Black families are often poor, less mobile, and less able to afford alternative
forms of entertainment and babysitters, [and thus] rely more heavily on TV as a source of
entertainment..."); Tangney & Feshback, supra note 94, at 146 ("Socioeconomic status
has also been related to television viewing.") (citation omitted). But see Comstock & Cob-
bey, supra note 96, at 105 ("Television ... plays a somewhat different role in the lives of
Negroes than of whites at similar levels of income and education.") (quoting from a study
conducted by W.R. Simmons).
100. See Jannette Dates, Race, Racial Attitudes and Adolescent Perceptions of Black
Television Characters, 24 J. BROADCASTING 549, 549 (1980) ("In order to consolidate iden-
tity, adolescents must learn something about the adult world and appropriate roles in that
world. Quite often, they turn to television for help. Adolescents sometimes experimen-
tally emulate television personalities and behavior patterns of television characters."); see
also Renee Hobbs, Teaching Media Literacy-Yo! Are You Hip to This?, MEDIA STUD. J.,
Winter 1994, at 143.
101. Walter M. Gerson, Mass Media Socialization Behavior: Negro-White Differences,
45 SOCIAL FORCES 40 (1966) (black adolescents are more likely than whites to use the
media to learn how to behave with members of the opposite sex); Poindexter & Stroman,
supra note 89, at 115 ("[bjlack children were significantly more likely than white children
to say they learned most of what they know about jobs, decision-making, problem-solving,
social interaction and how to behave from television") (citing the study conducted by
Bradley S. Greenberg and Charles K. Atkin, Learning About Minorities From Television).
102. The research suggests that children can be prejudiced by the age of two to two-
and-a-half, and that by the age of five, they know most racial stereotypes. See Maria.E.
Gutierrez, Children Like Me-Where Do We Fit In?, MEDIA STUD. J., Fall 1994, 85, 86.
[Vol. 18:509
DIVERSITY AND MINORITY STEREOTYPING IN TELEVISION
sion into the American culture, researchers have been evaluating and
assessing the various effects of the new medium. °3 Two of the "po-
tentially negative effects" identified during early studies were the "po-
tential of televised portrayals of minorities and women to cultivate
stereotypes about these groups" and the impact on "minorities' self-
concept."' 1 Other social scientists have "speculated" as to the influ-
ence of television on African-American children and concluded that
the medium impacts negatively on their self-concept. These social
scientists have found that "the exclusion of Blacks from television is
destructive to Black children's self-concept because it minimizes the
importance of their existence," and further, "that the television roles
in which Blacks are cast communicate to Black children the negative
value society places on them."' 0 5
Moreover, television has been identified as the primary contribu-
tor to negative stereotypes. Many commentators believe that the me-
dium serves as the "source" and "reinforcer" of negative beliefs that
African-Americans hold about themselves,10 6 and that others hold
about African-Americans.10 7
Dr. C. Cosby, quoting from the Warren study, states that "[t]he
image, that is, the impression, idea, and concept, of Black people in
the United States is heavily influenced by the projections we see on
film and on television." 108 Warren's study, she notes, determined that
103. Stroman, supra note 89, at 317. The other potentially negative effects identified
were: "(1) television's potential to incite aggressive, violent, or antisocial behavior; [and]
(2) television advertising's potentially negative effects." Id
104. Id.
105. Id. The prevailing opinion is that television has a negative influence on African-
American children in that it "may be providing examples and role models that negatively
affect Black children's attitudes and behavior." Id. at 322: see also Hammond, supra note
35, at 1085-86 ("Criticism of the majority media's portrayal-of minorities is not new....
[I]t is arguably merely the continuation of an historical tendency of majority-owned popu-
lar and mass media, literature and the arts to stereotypically portray blacks and other
minorities.").
106. Black adolescents probably use black TV characters as "referent significant
others," and thus reinforced by television characterizations, presumably perpetrate behav-
ior exhibited by the characters. Dates, supra note 100, at 550. "Black images of them-
selves had also been influenced significantly by TV. For so long, Black Americans had
been conditioned to model their lives on the big time drug pushers, pimps, prostitutes, and
gangsters that have predominantly represented them on TV." Evuleocha & Ugbah, supra
note 93, at 203.
107. ALETHA C. HUSTON ET AL., BIG WORLD, SMALL SCREEN 22 (Gary B. Melton &
Carolyn S. Schroeder eds. 1992) ("Under-representation and negative portrayals may in-
fluence the self-concepts and images of their own group for members of the affected cate-
gories and may also generate attitudes and beliefs about such groups among members of
the general public.").
108. COSBY, supra note 25, at 36 (citing N. Warren, From Uncle Tom to Cliff Huxtable,
Aunt Jemima to Aunt Nell: Images of Blacks in Film and the Television Industry, C. J.
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these images include, "Savage African, Happy slave, Devoted servant,
Corrupt politician, Irresponsible citizen, Petty thief, Social delinquent,
Vicious criminal, Sexual superman, Unhappy non-white, Natural-born
cook, Perfect entertainer, Superstitious churchgoer, Chicken and
watermelon eater, Razor and knife 'toter', Uninhibited expressionist,
Mentally inferior [and] Natural-born musician."'10 9 The overwhelming
research literature suggests that media distortions"0 that negatively
impact the self-esteem of African American children may preclude
them from achieving self-actualization or "impede their ability to real-
ize their personal and academic potential in American society."1 1
The studies also conclude that "[m]inority groups are under-rep-
resented in news programming, both as broadcasters and as subjects
of the news.""' 2 Research confirms that the news coverage relating to
African-Americans is consistently negative, focusing solely on crime
or other unpleasant characteristics." 13 The recent Advisory Report to
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that "[t]he news media has
tremendous influence on the attitudes of viewers ... regarding race
relations in this country ... [and t]here is significant merit in allega-
tions that the media presentation of news is biased when it comes to
Smith (Ed.), Images of Blacks in American Culture: A Reference Guide to Information
Sources, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press (1988)).
109. CosBY, supra note 25, at 36-37. "All of the stereotypes found in literature, on the
stage, and on radio are captured and reinforced by the camera's eye." Id. at 37 (quoting N.
Warren).
110. Cosby's study cites specific examples of such "media distortions" in various televi-
sion shows that were broadcasted over a forty year span. They include, she notes, (1)
"Amen," a series that featured a church deacon that engaged in "old-style hootin and
hollerin," and "verbal bark[ing] and bit[ing]"; (2) "Amos 'n' Andy," a series that engaged
in total stereotyping of African Americans, including an "asexual Black woman and infer-
ior, lazy, dumb, dishonest, and loud [Black] characters"; (3) "Benson," a series in which
Benson began as a satisfied servant who "develop[s] affection for the White folks who
employed him"; (4) "Beulah," a series depicting a friendly black maid, who so enjoyed her
White employers that "she had very little life of her own"; (5) "Gimme a Break," a series
featuring a Black "sassy and gutsy" housekeeper working for a White family; (6) "Good
Times," a series illustrating "the first Black family sitcom whose famous character, J.J., was
barely literate"; (7) "That's My Mama," a series that depicted numerous stereotypical char-
acters with an "all-sacrificing, large, warm-hearted mammy" in an "emasculated, Black
female-dominated home"; (8) "Different Strokes," a series that depicted African American
children being raised by a White male, with the children apparently having no Black rela-
tives or friends; and (9) "Sanford and Sons," a series that featured two "harmless and
naive" Black men who lived in a junkyard. COSBY, supra note 25, at 37-38 (citing D. Bo-
GLE, BLACKS IN AMERICAN FILMS AND TELEVISION: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA (1988)).
111. See COSBY, supra note 25, at 7. Dr. Cosby also asserts that there has been a consis-
tent and systematic effort to exclude positive images of African Americans from main-
stream television, movies, books, magazines, newspapers and other mediums. Id. at 2.
112. Huston, supra note 107, at 25.
113. Id
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reporting on people or communities of color.""' 4 The Advisory Re-
port concluded by issuing words of caution in pronouncing that such
"[c]ontinuous biased presentations foment unrest and contribute to
racial polarization. 11 5
Much of the social science literature on the impact of negative
portrayals of minorities in the television media confirms the validity of
such warnings. 1 6 The studies clearly suggest that these destructive
images serve to create or maintain negative intergroup attitudes such
as racism and prejudice" 17
B. The Deficiencies of Existing Regulatory Policy
The existing regulatory policy of the FCC, which acts to ensure
"diversity of viewpoint," has obviously failed to address properly the
compelling societal interest of eliminating racial stereotyping from tel-
evision broadcasting."' Television programming still maintains
114. STEREOTYPING OF MINORITIES, supra note 81, at 35.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Evuleocha and Ugbah, supra note 93. at 197 (depiction of Blacks on TV
has reinforced and sharpened prejudices of the White majority).
117. See id.
118. In March of 1972 the Surgeon General issued a tentative report on television vio-
lence, which found a "preliminary and tentative indication of a causal relation between
viewing violence on television and aggressive behavior." SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC
ADVISORY COMM. ON TELEVISION AND VIOLENCE, TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE
IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE 18-19 (1972). The FCC, in response to congressional
directives and the Surgeon General's report "that a steady stream of violence on television
may have an adverse effect upon our society-and particularly on children," id., issued a
report examining what steps could be taken to protect children from violent material which
"might be inappropriate for them." Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and
Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 418 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Obscenity Report]. The
FCC actually "pressured" the broadcasting industry into establishing the "Family Viewing
Hour" in 1974. Ian M. Ballard, Note, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: Television Violence and
the First Amendment, 81 VA. L. REV. 175, 178 (1995). The industry also adopted a "televi-
sion code" that stipulated "physical and psychological violence could be projected only in
'responsibly handled contexts' Id. at 179. The FCC's actions were later held to be in
violation of the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act in Writers Guild
of America, West v. FCC, but the court "refused to 'rule that the Commission could not
develop constitutional regulations.., which deal with the questions of violence or of pro-
gramming for children [via a different regulatory approach]."' Id. (quoting Writers Guild
of Am., West v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1149 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated sub nom, Writers
Guild of Am., West v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980)).
It would appear, however, that the FCC has failed to take comparable action in response
to the social science literature on racial stereotyping and its affect on African-American
children. Instead, the FCC has consistently responded to racial issues by focusing on "di-
versity of viewpoint" and minority "under-representation." See discussion supra note 77.
One author astutely notes, however, that "[n]egative stereotyping seems a worse affront to
equal respect than a mere failure to afford sufficient opportunities for self-expression."
Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 621.
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images and messages that are distorted and stereotypical. 1 9 The
FCC's minority ownership programs were unable to produce pro-
gramming in an advertiser-supported television economy that re-
flected African-Americans fairly and accurately. 120 One commentator
suggests that the inaccurate programming resulted from the underly-
ing motives of movie studios, directors, and producers in creating the
early imageries of African-Americans:
Hollywood was creating a lot of excitement in America. It was also
an important vehicle for assorted messages. Hollywood producers
learned early that people paid to, see what they wanted to see, even
if it was a fantasy. So loving darkies, sambos, hefty Black maids
who smiled and cooked all day, lazy Blacks who were lucky to live
on a plantation taking advantage of a doting benign master, if these
images were no longer to be had in real life, they were to be had on
the screen. And indeed were used to reinforce lost dominance.
21
119. See, e.g., When It Comes To Race, Journalism's House Is a Mess, ETHNIC NEW-
SWATCH, CHIC. WEEKEND, Sept. 11, 1994, at 19 ("'[T]here is a strong objection to many of
the roles and images transmitted including the clown image of television sitcoms' "new
vaudevillians," but particularly the messages of "gangsta" rappers rappin' about women as
"bitches" and "hos," and about guns and violence and cops."' (quoting Paul Delaney,
Chairman of the Journalism Department, University of Alabama)); Hernandez, The Race
Quotient, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAG., Aug. 1994 ("We see the stereotypes played out
over and over again[,] ... most black men portrayed on TV as either brutes or clowns.
That is a major part of the problem. These frames of reference resonate in our minds.")
(quoting Jannette Dates, Dean, School of Communications, Howard University); Greg
Braxton, Television: Where More Isn't Much Better; African Americans Are Increasingly
Welcome in Prime Time, But Some Observers Say the New Shows Fail to Rise Above Stereo-
types, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at 3 (discussing the Fall television season that included an
unprecedented number of prime-time series featuring predominantly African-American
casts, and stating, "[J]udging from the early episodes of the new shows,... many of the
programs have already fallen into the historic trap of perpetuating stereotypes and nega-
tive images that became dominant on other shows featuring African-Americans dating
back to the 1960s ... [, and] many of.the characters have slipped into 'minstrelsy."').
120. See Wimmer, supra note 34.
Blacks are still failing to make headway in their efforts to affect American society
through media, and the deregulation policy being followed in Congress and at the
FCC is among the reasons why. The roots of the relations between deregulation'
and lessening participation of minorities in the media lies in the fact that the mar-
ketplace cannot provide sufficient public interest programming.
... Minorities [are] foreclosed from relying on minority owners to produce minor-
ity programming, because marketplace regulation will produce greater impedi-
ments to minority entry into the telecommunications marketplace. The
Commission has, in the past, relied on minority-ownership and equal employment
to produce minority oriented programming. Such reliance will not continue to be
viable ....
Id. at 470-71.
121. COSBY, supra note 25, at 26 (citation omitted).
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Since minorities are not empowered to produce appropriate
images for the television screen,122 other regulatory avenues must be
identified and pursued by the FCC. Social science literature provides
a cogent argument for the need to reduce and eliminate racial stere-
otyping to ensure the psychological well-being of African-American
children.
III
A Race-Neutral Regulatory Approach: The Unsettled
First Amendment Issue
The importance of protecting children from unwarranted harm
has long been recognized by the courts. The United States Supreme
Court has acknowledged a "compelling" government interest in "safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being" of children 123 be-
cause "[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies."' 24 Consequently, the courts have used
this governmental interest argument to protect the "well-being of
youth"'125 by restricting the First Amendment rights of broadcast-
ers.'26 The social science research discussed in Part II provides a via-
ble justification for restrictive regulations that have as their objective
the reduction or elimination of racial stereotyping from television
broadcasting, 127 and provides the requisite compelling governmental
122. Even with the FCC minority preference programs in place, African-Americans
own only 21 of the 1,155 television stations in the United States, a scant 1.8%. Analysis
and Compilation of Minority-Owned Commercial Broadcast Stations in the United States,
The Minority Telecommunications Development Program, NTIA, Department of Com-
merce at 7 (Sept. 1994). Further, Dr. Cosby explains:
In television, as in all forms of media, most African-Americans do not con-
trol the content, the acting, nor the productions of their work. Again, African-
Americans are being defined by others. African-Americans' imageries are devel-
oped by the hegemonic strata within the television industry. This television hege-
monic strata consist of network executives, parent entities of the television
networks, sponsors, writers, and producers. They are responsible for the formula-
tion of television African-Americant imageries.
CosaY, supra note 25, at 4 (citation omitted).
123. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982).
124. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
125. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
126. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (allowing 'egulation of indecent
broadcasting). The courts have also recognized a compelling interest in protecting children
from indecent telephone messages and have allowed restrictions that sought to "shield"
them from materials that were "not obscene by adult standards." Sable Communications
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
127. Note the critical role that social science research data has played in the on-going
debate on the impact of television violence on children: "findings" from many of the
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interest to withstand any judicial challenge to the regulations. Part III
provides a legal analysis of First Amendment jurisprudence and con-
cludes that racial stereotyping in broadcast media is protected speech,
but proffers that the causal link between racial stereotyping on televi-
sion and its overwhelming negative effects on children provides a legal
basis for broadcast regulation. Part III therefore proposes the adop-
tion of several alternative regulatory approaches to reduce stereotypi-
cal imagery. The proposals offered are "narrowly tailored," and
therefore should be able to withstand the level of scrutiny associated
with the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. 128
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press.' 1 29 The objective of the First Amendment is
to ensure that the government cannot prohibit speech simply because
the content of the speech is unfavorable or contrary to its policies. 3°
Instead, the Constitution requires the government to remain "neutral
in the marketplace of ideas.' 131 However, the Supreme Court has
held that not all speech is entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. 132 The government has the power to regulate the con-
tent of specified classes of speech, including obscenity, 33 libel, 34 child
pornography, 35 and words which by their very utterance incite vio-
lence or inflict injury. 1 36
House bills aimed at regulating the electronic media professed the existence of scientific
evidence demonstrating that "televised violence has a deleterious effect on children, and
use[d] this information as explicit or implicit support for the legislative action proposed."
Ballard, supra note 118, at 184 n.69.
128. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (government may regulate the content of constitution-
ally protected speech when it has established a substantial interest and has chosen the least
restrictive means to further its goal); see also discussion infra notes 218-219 and accompa-
nying text.
129. U.S. CONST. amend. I: see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
130. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957).
131. FCC v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
132. Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). The availability of First Amendment
protection hinges on whether the particularized conduct constitutes speech or expression.
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 15-26 (1971) (absent the expression of ideas or com-
munication, there is no First Amendment protection).
133. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
134. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
135. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
136. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court held that
fighting words are not accorded constitutional protection. 137 The
Court reasoned that such utterances lack significance to the exposition
of ideas, 138 have little social value, and therefore any benefit from the
speech is clearly outweighed by the harm to society. 139 The Court
stated that resorting "to epithets or personal abuse is not in any
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded
by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise
no question under that instrument.' 140
In Roth v. United States, the Supreme Court held that obscenity is
not protected under the First Amendment.14 1 The Court concluded,
in light of the history of obscenity regulation, that the First Amend-
ment was clearly not intended to protect all forms of speech. 142 Jus-
tice William Brennan noted the existence of colonial laws against libel
and profanity at the time the Constitution was ratified and concluded
that obscenity was, in fact, related to profanity.143 Relying on the rea-
soning set forth in Chaplinsky, the Court found obscenity to be
outside the area of constitutionally protected speech or press, because
it lacks any redeeming social importance.'"
However, in Miller v. California, the Court confined state regula-
tion of obscene materials to those "works which, taken as a whole,
appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in
a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."' 45 The Court
stressed that such a limit on state regulation of obscene material is
necessary to ensure that the rights guaranteed under the First Amend-
ment are protected. 46 The Court recognized, however, the legitimate
137. Id.; see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 (1969) (words directed to-
wards inciting imminent lawless action and likely to have such an effect are not protected
under the Constitution). See generally R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(fighting words can be regulated because of their content without violating the First
Amendment). But see United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (fiagburning as a
mode of expression, unlike obscenity and fighting words, enjoys full protection under the
First Amendment).
138. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940)).
141. Roth, 354 U.S. at 476 (1957) (Roth was charged with mailing an obscene book and
obscene circulars and advertising in violation of the federal obscenity statute).
142. Id. at 483.
143. Id. at 482-84. In 1712, the Court noted, it was a crime to publish "any filthy, ob-
scene, or profane song, pamphlet, libel or mock sermon" that imitated religious services in
Massachusetts. Id.
144. Id. at 484.
145. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 115.
146. Id. at 25.
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interests of the states in protecting social order and morality.'47 Thus,
states can regulate material deemed obscene, 48 as determined by the
average person applying contemporary community standards.
1 49
Likewise, libel is not accorded First Amendment protection. In
Beauharnais v. Illinois, the Supreme Court concluded that libelous ut-
terances are not protected under the Constitution. 5 1 The Court
stated that "[i]t has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." ' 1
Furthermore, in Gertz v. Welch, the Supreme Court determined
that states have a legitimate interest in compensating private individu-
als for harm inflicted upon them by libelous speech.'5 2 The Court
ruled that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory false-
hoods about a private individual cannot claim constitutional privilege
against libel.'53 Unlike public figures and officials, the Court con-
cluded, private individuals lack access to the channels of effective
communication to refute false statements. 5 4 The Court postulated
that because private individuals have not "accepted public office or
assumed an influential role in ordering society," they are more vulner-
able to injury than public figures and thus deserve greater access to
redress from the courts. 155
In sum, First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that the govern-
ment does possess the authority to proscribe certain types of speech.
In addition, the courts have allowed the government to engage in con-
tent regulation of certain classes of protected First Amendment
147. Id. at 29; see Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) (holding that
states have power to regulate the unlimited display or distribution of obscene material).
148. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J. dissenting) (because
states have the power to make the morally neutral judgment that commerce in obscene
material has the potential of injuring the community as a whole, they may regulate
obscenity).
149. Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
150. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 250.
151. Id. at 256-257.
152. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz brought a libel action against a pub-
lisher of a magazine article that described him as a "communist-fronter," "Leninist," and
participant in various "Marxist" and "red" activities. Id.
153. Id. But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding under
the First Amendment that a public figure cannot recover damages for libel unless she
proves the defendant acted with knowledge that the challenged statement was false or
made with reckless disregard for the statement's truth).
154. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344.
155. Id. at 345.
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speech. Commercial speech, which has been afforded constitutional
protection, may be regulated in those instances where the government
has asserted a substantial interest. 156 Consequently, a determination
as to whether commercial speech is subject to governmental regula-
tion requires an analysis of the content of the speech.'
57
Similarly, state governments have been allowed to proscribe child
pornography because the state has a compelling interest. 158  The
Court. has ,held that child pornography is not entitled to First Amend-
ment protection, provided the conduct to be prohibited is adequately
defined by applicable state law.' 59 Significantly, and due in part to its
unique nature, broadcasting is subject to government regulation in the
area of protected speech deemed by the Court to be indecent; 60 the
courts have permitted unprecedented governmental regulation of the
broadcasting media because of the recognized impact television view-
ing has on children.' 61
B. Broadcast Regulation: A First Amendment Anomaly
The extent of First Amendment protection available to certain
speech varies according to the medium involved. 162  In this context,
the print medium enjoys virtually absolute protection from govern-
156. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563, 566
(1980); see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1989); Daniel A. Farber & John
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1228 (1984).
157. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. 427 U.S. 50, 68-69 (1976).
158. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
159. The test for child pornography is not the same as obscenity: State regulation is
limited to works that visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specific age, and
the category of "sexual conduct" prohibited has to be suitably limited and described. Id. at
764; see Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (holding Ohio's prohibition against possess-
ing and viewing child pornography in compliance with the First Amendment because the
"state has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of
minors and in destroying a market for exploitative use of a child by penalizing those who
possess and view the offending materials").
160. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). The justification for regulating
the broadcast media is rooted in the theory that the American public is best served when it
receives a broad array of viewpoints. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969).
161. See discussion infra notes 178-199 and accompanying text.
162. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The courts have held that each medium must be assessed
by standards specifically suited to it. Southeastern Promotion, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S.
546, 557 (1975) (focusing on whether the medium informs as well as entertains); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (holding that movies are protected speech
as a "significant medium for the communication of ideas"). For an interesting analysis of
First Amendment implications relating to the disparate regulation of the electronic media
spawned by new technologies, see Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amend-
ment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062 (1994).
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ment regulation. 163 The courts have recognized the primacy of a pub-
lishers' First Amendment rights over others' claims of access, even
where the newspaper possesses an economic monopoly and has the
requisite power to exclude particular speech from its pages. 164 Courts
have recognized an infringement of First Amendment interests in situ-
ations in which government regulation has the potential of interfering
with a publisher's "editorial control and judgment" regarding what in-
formation to report.165 Moreover, because economic and other fac-
tors may limit the total number of pages printed, forcing the publisher
to print certain speech may, in effect, substitute the compelled speech
for material the publisher would rather include. 166 In addition, regula-
tions such as the right of reply penalize controversial speech by forc-
ing the publisher to afford space for a response. 67  In such
circumstances, the publisher may be forced to associate with speech
that it finds disagreeable because others view the compelled speech as
carrying the publisher's affirmation.168
Broadcast speech receives the most limited form of First Amend-
ment protection. 69 Thus, broadcasters can lose their licenses if the
FCC determines that such action will serve the public interest, con-
venience, and necessity. 71 In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,171 the
Supreme Court held that a broadcast licensee does not have a consti-
tutional right to hold a license or to monopolize a radio frequency to
the exclusion of fellow citizens.' 72 Therefore, a licensee can be re-
quired to share its allotted frequency with others and to conduct itself
as a fiduciary, obliged to give suitable time and attention to matters of
great public concern. Such a restriction furthers the First Amendment
goal of producing an informed public, capable of conducting its own
affairs. 73 Further, in light of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the
163. One commentator has observed, however, that the print media experiences some
limited regulatory constraints as a result of state-supported causes of action for libel, inva-
sion of privacy, and antitrust. wimmer, supra note 34, at 413.
164. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 247-58 (1974) (holding
that Florida's "right of reply" statute, guaranteeing political candidates space to respond to
criticism in newspapers, violated the First Amendment).
165. Id. at 258.
166. Id. at 256-57.
167. Id.
168. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1986).
169. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
170. Id.
171. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 392. In addition, the Court stated that the granting of a license could in part
be contingent on a licensee's willingness to present representative community views on
controversial issues, as opposed to presenting only its own view. See Associated Press v.
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Court in Red Lion held that the government has a duty to assist unli-
censed persons in gaining access to the allocated frequencies to ex-
press their views. 174 Consequently, broadcasters are obligated to act
as public trustees. 1
75
For several reasons, the Court has found that such restrictions on
broadcasting do not contravene the First Amendment. 176 First, broad-
casting is pervasive in American society. Unlike other media, it is dif-
ficult to issue warnings regarding unexpected program content
because the broadcast audience is constantly "tuning in and out. ' 1 77
Second, and perhaps more important, broadcasting is easily accessible
by children.178 Based upon these rationales, the government can regu-
late broadcasting when it has a compelling interest; and the courts
have concluded that such an interest exists with respect to indecent
programming. 179
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (The goal of the First Amendment is to achieve "the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.").
174. Id. at 400. As one commentator explains, "The trusteeship model holds that a
broadcaster holds a publicly owned share of the radio spectrum for the benefit of the pub-
lic, rather than for its own benefit. As such, it is expected to perform some measure of
public service, in the form of nonentertainment programming, in exchange for its use of a
government-granted monopoly." Wimmer, supra note 34, at 412 n.442.
175. The physical scarcity of the electromagnetic spectrum comprises one of the pri-
mary justifications for broadcast regulation: Because "the facilities of radio are not large
enough to accommodate all who wish to use them," federal regulatory decisions must allo-
cate frequencies to further the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943). Many legal commentators question the continued va-
lidity of the scarcity justification as the basis for regulating the broadcast media. They
argue that technological innovations have substantially increased the capacity of the spec-
trum and that the sheer number of channels now available for programming negates the
scarcity argument. See Tabor, supra note 63, at 629; Ballard, supra note 118, at 204;
Message in the Medium, supra note 162, at 1072-74; L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987). The Supreme Court has recently declined to
question the validity of the doctrine. See Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2457 (1994) (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 n.ll (1984).
176. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
177. Id.; see also Action For Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
178. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
179. The FCC's authority to regulate indecent speech derives from the United States
Criminal Code, which provides, "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent or profane lan-
guage by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or impris-
oned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982). However, § 326 of the
Communications Act of 1934 provides that nothing in that chapter "shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications
or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promul-
gated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communication." 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982). In spite of the apparent incon-
gruity, the Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica found the statutes compatible. 438 U.S. at
737. The Court also held that the FCC's regulations prohibiting obscene, indecent, or pro-
fane language comported with the First Amendment rights of broadcasters. Id. at 741.
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In Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court addressed the FCC's
power to protect radio listeners who wanted to keep indecent broad-
casts out of their homes and away from their children. 8 ° A radio sta-
tion had broadcast a prerecorded monologue, which contained
language unsuitable for the airwaves, at two o'clock in the afternoon,
and a parent complained to the FCC.' The Commission refused to
impose any penalty on the station, but instead issued a warning that
sanctions might result against the station if future indecent broadcasts
occurred. 182 The radio station appealed the warning to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. 83
The Supreme Court agreed with the FCC's conclusion that the
monologue was indecent, and found that the Commission's issuance
of a warning did not violate the broadcaster's First Amendment rights.
The Court concluded that the FCC had the right to bar indecent
though constitutionally protected speech from the airwaves in the
middle of the afternoon. 84 Focusing on the pervasiveness of the
broadcast media, the Court stated, "Patently offensive, indecent mate-
rial presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in pub-
lic, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to
be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder.""'
Hence, the Court held that the government can engage in content
regulation of constitutionally protected speech. Even though the
Court reiterates that the most offensive words are entitled to First
Amendment protection, it conceded that such offensive speech can be
regulated when broadcast in the wrong context. 8 6
The Supreme Court in Pacifica also addressed the accessibility of
broadcasting to children. It found that "Pacifica's broadcast could
have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant. . . . The govern-
ment's interest in the well-being of its youth and in supporting par-
180. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 727 (1978).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 730.
183. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (1976), rev'd, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726. (1978).
184. The Supreme Court defined indecency as "language that describes, in terms pa-
tently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast me-
dium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
185. Id. at 748.
186. The Court in Pacifica found that the monologue was broadcast in the wrong con-
text: during the middle of the day when children were likely to be in the audience. How-
ever, had the monologue been broadcast at 2:00 a.m., it would have been constitutionally
protected. Id
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ents' claim to authority in their own household justifies the regulation
of otherwise protected expression.""1 7 According to the Court, the
ease with which children could gain access to indecent programming
justified its regulation. 18 Thus, the pervasiveness of the broadcast
media and the accessibility of children to the content of broadcast pro-
gramming constitutes a compelling justification for regulating, in cer-
tain contexts, constitutionally protected speech. 189
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently deter-
mined the constitutionality of section 16(a) of the Public Telecommu-
nications Act of 1992,190 a statute enacted by Congress to shield
minors from indecent radio and television programs by restricting the
hours within which they may be broadcast.' 91 In determining whether
section 16(a) survived the strict scrutiny requirements of the First
Amendment, the court stated that an assessment must "necessarily
take into account the unique context of the broadcast medium. ' 192 In
ruling that the Act was constitutionally valid, the court concluded that
the FCC's justification for regulating broadcast decency derived from
a "compelling interest" in children's welfare. 93 The court not only
acknowledged a compelling interest in "supporting parental supervi-
sion of what children see and hear on the public airwaves," but also
pronounced that the government has its "own interest in the well-be-
ing of minors [that] provides an independent justification for the regu-
lation of broadcast indecency."' 94
187. Id. at 749.
188. Id. at 750.
189. The courts have concluded that the government has two "compelling interests"
with regard to children: The first is the interest in helping parents supervise their children.
See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (finding that materials being regulated
were obscene for minors but not for adults). The second is the interest in shielding minors
from physical and psychological abuse. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-58
(1982).
190. Pub L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949 (1992). Section 16(a) of the Act provides that
the FCC must promulgate regulations to prohibit the broadcasting of indecent
programming:
(1) between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. on any day by any public radio station or public
television station that goes off the air at or before 12 midnight; and
(2) between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on any day for any radio or television broad-
casting station not described in paragraph (1).
47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV 1992).
191. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 701 (1996).
192. Action for Children's Television, 58 F.3d at 660.
193. Id. at 660-61.
194. Id. at 661 (emphasis added). The court stated that "[a] democratic society rests,
for its continuance, upon'the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full ma-
turity as citizens." Id. (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)). The
court rejected the argument made by the petitioners that the FCC had failed to establish a
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C. First Amendment Implications of Regulating Racial Stereotyping on
Television
In order to determine whether a proposal to regulate racial stere-
otyping meets constitutional standards, it is necessary initially to cre-
ate the proper First Amendment analytical construct. The Supreme
Court has held that not all types of speech receive full First Amend-
ment protection. 195 Therefore, as a preliminary matter, one must de-
termine how the regulation of televised racial stereotyping would
comport with pronounced constitutional standards. This analysis is
complicated by the unique treatment that has historically been ac-
corded to the broadcasting medium and the special importance that
Congress and the FCC have bestowed upon the protection of young
children.
1. Televised Racial Stereotyping: Protected or Unprotected Speech?
The Supreme Court has clearly pronounced that the First
Amendment does not prohibit all government regulation regarding
the content of speech. 196 The oft-quoted language on the need to ana-
lyze both the content and the context of speech in order to assess its
constitutional status is the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck
v. United States:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within
their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends
upon the circumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shout-
ing fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a
man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the
effect of force.... The question in every case is whether the words
used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
"casual nexus" between indecency and any physical or psychological harm to minors, and
observed, "[Tihe Supreme Court has never suggested that a scientific demonstration of
psychological harm is required in order to establish the constitutionality of measures pro-
tecting minors from exposure to indecent speech." Id. at 661-62. The court concluded:
"[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that the Government's interest in protecting chil-
dren extends beyond shielding them from physical and psychological harm .... [T]he
Court ... [has] sought to protect children from exposure to materials that would 'impair[ ]
[their] ethical and moral development."' Id. at 661-62 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629, 641 (1968)).
195. See discussion supra note 194.
196. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744.
197. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Justice Douglas, however, in his
concurring opinion in Brandenburg v. Ohio, articulated the belief that "Mr. Justice
Holmes, though never formally abandoning the 'clear and present danger' test", had
"moved closer to the First Amendment ideal." 395 U.S. 444, 452 (1969). He proffered this
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The Court has been reluctant, however, to extend the categories
of unprotected speech and has never had the opportunity to consider
televised racial stereotyping in a First Amendment context. Neverthe-
less, many legal commentators have attempted to carve out new classi-
fications of speech that fall beyond the boundaries of constitutional
protections. 198
The Court's jurisprudence on speech relating to violence and law-
less action supports a plausible argument for classifying televised ra-
cist imagery as unprotected speech. The viability of this argument,
however, requires acceptance of the correlation between racial stere-
otyping and racist speech. 199
Although one could intuitively argue that words which "incite or
produce" lawless action are comparable to "racist speech," the
notion by quoting Justice Holmes' language in Gitlow v. New York: "Every idea is an in-
citement .... The only difference between the expression of an opinion and an incitement
in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at
452.
198. In an effort to determine whether the violence portrayed in the broadcasting me-
dia could be deemed unprotected speech, one commentator has argued that the Court's
reasoning in classifying obscenity as unprotected should be analyzed. Ballard, supra note
118, at 192-95. The Court has deemed unprotected those "utterances" lacking the "exposi-
tion of ideas" with no social value as a step to truth, and in addition, Ballard concludes, has
allowed the suppression of obscene material as a "public safety" measure. Id. at 193-94.
The Court, Ballard opines, has also suggested that regulation is allowable if it furthers the
state's interest in maintaining a "decent society" and has, as a consequence, permitted the
regulation of material that offends the "sensibilities of unwilling recipients." Id. at 194-95.
At first glance, the Court's rationale of maintaining a "decent society" and protecting
the "sensibilities" of the unwilling listener would appear to reach the content and context
of stereotypical imagery in the broadcast media. However, as Ballard acknowledges, such
a simplistic analogy and resulting supposition would ignore the Court's traditional stance
regarding the sanctity of First Amendment protections. Id. at 195. Ballard argues that the
Supreme Court believes "the First Amendment is designed to protect 'all ideas having
even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion."' Id. (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). The notion, therefore, of successfully establishing tele-
vised racial stereotyping as a category of unprotected speech, based on theories espoused
by the Court in Chaplinsky, Paris Adult Theatre I, and Miller v. California appears doubt-
ful. The courts have even rejected the government's efforts to prohibit the use of trade
names such as "Sambo's" that are clearly offensive to the great majority of the African-
American community. See Sambo's Restaurant v. City of Ann Arbor, 663 F.2d 686, 694-95
(6th Cir. 1981).
199. In other words, the Court's reasoning regarding speech that is aimed at "inciting"
violence should be applied to racist speech because both forms of speech have the poten-
tial to "incite or produce" lawless actions. See generally Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447;
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. Importantly, social science research has concluded that televi-
sion has the potential to quell racial discord by improving intergroup attitudes and behav-
iors. See Huston et al., supra note 107, at 26 (Investigations have indeed concluded that
"prosocial interactions and nonstereotypic portrayals can lead to cooperation, reduction in
prejudice ... and good citizenship.").
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Supreme Court has rejected the notion.2"' In Brandenburg v. Ohio, a
Ku Klux Klan leader was convicted under an Ohio statute for "advo-
cating" a crime of violence as a means of accomplishing "political re-
form." He had attended a rally, and while standing hooded at a large,
burning wooden cross shouted, "This is what we are going to do to the
niggers," and "Bury the niggers."' 1 The Supreme Court held that the
Ohio statute violated the First Amendment in that it prohibited the
"mere advocacy" of violence, thus failing to distinguish "mere advo-
cacy" from "incitement to imminent lawless action. 20 2 Therefore,
speech advocating violence may only be proscribed when it is "di-
rected to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and "likely to
incite or produce such action."2 03 Because Brandenburg requires that
the danger posed by the speech be "imminent, 2 0 4 even televised ra-
cist speech would lack the necessary immediacy of reaction that the
standard enunciates.
Feminist legal scholars have also embarked on the quest to carve
out a new classification of unprotected speech, arguing that pornogra-
phy is "immoral in a humanistic sense" because it "negatively impacts
women's status" and societal treatment. 20 5 They contend that pornog-
raphy should be regulated because it is "an institution of gender ine-
quality" that actually harms women.20 6 Feminists also note that
psychological studies indicate that "depictions of sexual aggression
with positive consequences" may negatively influence the "viewer's
perceptions of and attitudes toward women. ' 20 7 They persuasively ar-
gue that First Amendment rights can be abridged if the speech engen-
ders results that are harmful to society.
The Supreme Court of Canada has considered and accepted the
theory that graphic sexual subordination of women leads to discrimi-
nation and even violence against women. In Regina v. Butler,20 8 the
court evaluated, for purposes of classifying sexually explicit materials,
200. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
201. Id. at 446 n.1.
202. Id. at 448-49.
203. Id. at 447.
204. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
205. Angela A. Liston, Pornography and the First Amendment: The Feminist Balance,
27 ARiM. L. REV. 415, 416 (1985); see also Carol Sanger, Seasoned to the Use, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 1334 (1989).
206. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321, 325
(1984).
207. Liston, supra note 205, at 422.
208. 89 D.L.R.4th 449 (1992). For a discussion of the Butler decision, see Jeffrey
Toobin, X-Rated: Anti-Pornography Feminists Praised Canada's 1992 Butler Ruling as a
Breakthrough, but Two Years Later Obscenity Isn't any Easier to Define, NEW YORKER,
Oct. 3, 1994, at 70.
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the effects of portraying women in degrading or dehumanizing sexual
acts. Writing for the court, Justice John Sopinka stated that the
court's "understanding of the harms caused by these materials ha[d]
developed considerably"2 °9 in recent years. Convinced that pornogra-
phy is a form of sexual discrimination, Justice Sopinka concluded, "If
true equality between male and female persons is to be achieved, we
cannot ignore the threat to equality resulting from exposure to audi-
ences of certain types of violent and degrading material."2 1 The
court indicated that "[m]aterials portraying women as a class as ob-
jects for sexual exploitation and abuse have a negative impact on the
individuals' sense of self-worth and acceptance," and therefore result
in "harm, particularly to women, and therefore society as a whole." '211
The courts in this country, however, have rejected the feminists'
"social harm" theory.21 2 In American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held unconstitutional an Indian-
apolis city ordinance prohibiting "pornography" as a "discriminatory
practice based on [gender]. ''213 The court concluded that the state's
interest in sex-based equality was not so "compelling" as to warrant
an exception to free speech protections. Though it acknowledged that
pornography has deleterious social effects, the court rejected the so-
cial harm theory in invalidating the ordinance, and found that the First
Amendment's protections reached even "insidious" speech.214
It would appear, based on the above analysis of free speech juris-
prudence, that televised racial stereotyping constitutes protected
speech. Although various theories and theorists support a contrary
conclusion,21 5 the Supreme Court has failed to embrace any of these
suppositions. Moreover, case law illustrates that the Court steadfastly
refuses to adopt new First Amendment exceptions.216
209. Butler, 89 D.L.R.4th at 478.
210. Id. at 479.
211. Id. at 467.
212. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 330.
215. Other legal commentators have urged that First Amendment protections should
be bestowed guardedly, and only upon certain kinds of speech. See Jay A. Gayoso, Com-
ment, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened Approach for Remov-
ing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871, 879 (1989) (noting legal
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn argues that because broadcasting is an entertainment me-
dium, it has no legitimate claim to the principles of free speech); Frederick Schauer, Speech
and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitu-
tional Language, 67 GEO. L. J. 899, 921 (1979) (arguing protected speech should be limited
to "communication of a mental stimulus").
216. See discussion supra note 194.
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Thus, it is necessary to analyze the limitations imposed on the
First Amendment rights of broadcasters to determine the viability of
any government regulation that has as its objective the reduction or
elimination of negative racial imagery.217 Because of the scarcity of
frequencies and broadcasters' resultant obligation to provide public
service, the courts have deemed some governmental restrictions on
content-based speech permissible when applied to broadcasting.218
The government has been permitted to "place limited content re-
straints, and impose certain affirmative obligations, on broadcast
licensees ' 219 when such restrictions are "narrowly tailored to further a
substantial governmental interest. 220
In Turner Broadcasting, the Supreme Court explained that broad-
cast regulation imposing an "incidental burden on speech '221 with-
stands constitutional scrutiny if "it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest. 222
The Court declared that the "narrowly tailored" aspect of the
O'Brien test did not require the "least restrictive means," but rather
that "the means chosen [did] not burden substantially more speech
than [was] necessary to further the government's legitimate inter-
est."' 223 The Court further explained that this test is met "so long as
the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.
224
217. The Supreme Court has "long recognized that each medium of expression presents
special First Amendment problems. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (citations omitted).
218. Red Lion v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-89 (1969) (broadcasters have a unique duty to
act as fiduciaries for the public); see also Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 567
(1990) (Congress has authority to impose programming constraints that serve important
public needs).
219. Turner Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994), reh'g denied, 115 S.
Ct. 30 (1994).
220. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 364-65 (1984).




224. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1988)).
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2. Education, Advertising, Indecency, and Violence: The Compelling State
Interest in Protecting Children
The FCC has been regulating children's television since the
1970s225 and submitted its first major statement on the issue in 1974.226
The 1974 Policy Statement recognized the existence of a "special obli-
gation" to children 227 and encouraged broadcasters to make a "mean-
ingful effort" to provide more children's programming.228
In 1979 the FCC initiated an evaluation of the industry's compli-
ance with its 1974 voluntary provisions.229 The evaluation disclosed a
"de minimus" increase in children's programming and resulted in a
Commission-initiated round of regulatory proceedings. In an effort to
identify an alternative regulatory approach, the FCC issued a Notice
of Proposed Rule Making,23° but subsequently decided to retain its
225. See In re Petition of Action for Children's TV (ACT) for Rule Making Looking
Toward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Program-
ming, Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 28 F.C.C.2d 368 (1971). As
early as 1960, however, the FCC had classified "children" as one of several groups that
required specific programming by television licensees in order to meet their public interest
responsibilities. See Network Programming Inquiry, Report and Statement of Policy, 25
Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960).
226. In re Petition of Action for Children's TV (ACT) for Rule Making Looking To-
ward the Elimination of Sponsorship and Commercial Content in Children's Programming
and the Establishment of a Weekly 14 Hour Quota of Children's TV Programs, Children's
Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Policy State-
ment]. The inquiry into children's programming had been prompted by a filing in 1970 by
the Action for Children's Television (ACT). The petition essentially asked the FCC to
promulgate rules limiting the number of hours of children's programming per week, and
rules eliminating sponsorship and commercials on children's television.
227. Id. para. 15.
228. Id. para. 12. The 1974 Policy Statement guidelines also placed limits on advertising
and asked television stations to keep programs and commercials separate. Id. paras. 46-56.
The FCC's guidelines provided for full compliance by January 1, 1976, and though the
Commission expected the industry to police itself, the FCC revised its license renewal
forms to obtain specific information on children's programming and advertisement. The
Commission's actions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Action
for Children's TV v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC's decision not to adopt
specific regulations governing advertising and programming practices for children's televi-
sion was a reasoned exercise of its broad discretion.).
229. The FCC established a Children's Task Force to assess industry compliance. See In
re Children's Programming and Advertising Practices, Second Notice of Inquiry, 68
F.C.C.2d 1344 (1978). The Task Force concluded that although compliance with the adver-
tising guidelines had been achieved, the overall amount of programming for children had
increased by less than one hour per week. See In re Children's Television Programming
and Advertising Practices, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 F.C.C.2d 138 app. A (1979)
[hereinafter 1979 Notice].
230. The 1979 Notice considered five policy options: (1) repeal the policy statement and
instead rely on commercial stations, cable, and subscription television to provide additional
children's programming; (2) keep the guidelines and modify the renewal process for licen-
sees to obtain mandatory programming requirements for specific information on children's
programming; (3) adopt mandatory programming requirements for specific amounts of ed-
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policy of voluntary industry compliance. 231 The Commission acknowl-
edged, however, the special nature of children's television, stating that
a "[b]roadcaster's public service obligation includes a responsibility to
provide diversified programming designed to meet the varied needs
and interests of the child audience," because "the child audience is a
unique one that warrants special programming attention from licen-
sees."2 32 The Commission concluded that "there is a continuing duty,
under the public interest standard, on each licensee to examine the
program needs of the child part of the audience and to be ready to
demonstrate at renewal time its attention to those needs. 233
In the 1980s, the Commission's efforts toward ensuring the devel-
opment of children's programming waned. In keeping with the mas-
sive deregulation policies of the Reagan Administration,234 the FCC
in its 1984 Report and Order explained that television was adequately
serving the needs of children.235 Moreover, the Commission con-
cluded that any additional regulation would overburden the broadcast
industry and possibly reduce the quality of programming available for
children.236 Ultimately, the courts determined that the FCC's deregu-
lation efforts were lacking adequate justification and were therefore
improper.237 One court reasoned that because of the FCC's "long his-
ucational programming at renewal time; (4) adopt guidelines for reviewing station per-
formance on children's programming at renewal time; and (5) encourage the growth of
cable and other new distribution systems. 1979 Notice, supra note 229, paras. 31-50.
231. In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and
Order, 96 F.C.C.2d 634, para. 43 (1984).
232. Id.
233. Id. para. 46.
234. See Diane A. Hayes, The Children's Hour Revisited: The Children's Television Act
of 1990, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 293, 299 (1994).
235. In re Children's TV Programming and Advertising Practices, Report and Order. 96
F.C.C.2d 634, para. 32 (1984).
236. Id. para. 42.
237. Action for Children's TV v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (regarding
replacement of logging requirements with quarterly lists and commercial guidelines). The
court stated: "As the agency has seen it, kids are different; the Commission cannot now
cavalierly revoke its special policy for youngsters without reexamining its earlier conclu-
sions." Id. at 747. During this period the FCC did engage in enforcement proceedings
prohibiting broadcasters' use of "indecent language." See, e.g., In re Infinity Broadcasting
Corp. of Pa., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987) (citing "seven dirty
words" approved by the Supreme Court in Pacifica). These proceedings constituted a dif-
ferent regulatory approach in that they prohibited the use of "indecent" material that was
broadcast after 10 p.m. and fell outside the fact pattern of Pacifica. See also In re Pacifica
Found., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2698 (1987); In re Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2703 (1987). The D.C.
Circuit reviewed the FCC's actions in Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d
1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court rejected the argument that the Commission's definition of
indecency was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 1338-40. However, the court
vacated the Commission's enforcement actions with respect to the after-10 p.m. broadcasts.
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tory . . . of separate treatment of children's television," it could not
suddenly eliminate all of its regulatory measures without some clear,
precise reasoning.z38
Congress also understood the importance of addressing this issue:
from 1985 to 1988, numerous congressional bills were introduced pro-
posing increased broadcast regulation.239 By 1990, Congress had en-
acted legislation that imposed regulatory responsibilities on the
FCC.240
Congress cited the "integral part" television plays in a child's life
to justify enacting the Children's Television Act of 1990.241 Concur-
The court concluded that the FCC had failed to gather adequate factual support to show
that its actions were necessary to achieve the government's goal of protecting unsupervised
children from exposure to indecent material. Id. at 1341-44. It remanded the matter to the
FCC with instructions to conduct "full and fair hearings." Id. Immediately after the
court's decision, Congress enacted legislation instructing the FCC to promulgate regula-
tions "enforc[ing] the provision of ... section [1464] on a 24 hour-per-day basis." Pub. L.
No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988). The FCC complied. In re Enforcement of
Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Order, 4
FCC Rcd. 457 (1988). In Action for Children's Television v. FCC, the court rejected the 24-
hour ban, concluding its previous holding "that the Commission must identify some rea-
sonable period of time during which indecent material may be broadcast necessarily means
that the Commission may not ban such broadcasts entirely." 932 F.2d 1509. (D.C. Cir.
1991). Congress then enacted the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-356, 106 Stat. 949 (1992). Section 16(a) of the Act directed the FCC to prohibit such
activities as the broadcasting of indecent programming between 6 a.m. and 12 midnight on
any day for any radio or television broadcasting station. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV 1992).
The D.C. Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Act in Action for Children's Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654,(D.C. Cir. 1995).
238. Action for Children's TV, 821 F.2d at 747.
239. See, e.g., H.R. 3288, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (introduced by Congressman
Terry Bruce (D-III.)); S. 1594, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Senator Frank
Lautenberg, (D-N.J.)); H.R. 3216, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced by Congress-
man Timothy Wirth (D-Colo.)). One piece of legislation passed both houses, but was
pocket vetoed by President Reagan in 1988: H.R. 3966, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (intro-
duced by Congressman John Bryant (D-Tex.)). See Reagan Kills Children's TV Bil4 Indus-
try, Hill, Stunned by Veto, BROADCASTING, Nov. 14, 1988, at 68.
240. H.R. 1677, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Congressman John Bryant
(D-Tex.)). The Children's Television Act of 1990 places time restrictions on advertising
during children's programming requiring broadcasters to make an effort to air program-
ming that benefits children. It further informs broadcasters that at license renewal time,
compliance with these factors will be considered as part of their duty to program in the
public interest. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303a, 313b (Supp. III 1991). The Act also authorizes the FCC
to examine how well a licensee is following the advertising restrictions and whether the
licensee is meeting the "educational and informational needs of children." Pub. L. No.
101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990).
241. H.R. REP. No. 385, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1605 ("[B]y the time the average child is 18 years old, he or she has spent between 10,000
[and] 15,000 hours watching television .... has been exposed to more than 200,000 com-
mercials, . . .[and has spent] more time watching television than he or she spends in
school.").
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ring with the FCC, Congress expressed a belief that young children
are "unique" in that their "trusting" natures render them "vulnerable"
to the messages conveyed by the television medium.242 Moreover,
Congress explained that children "cannot distinguish conceptually be-
tween programming" and commercial messages.243 It was this
"unique susceptibility" of children, coupled with Congress' refusal to
rely on "marketplace forces" to protect children from commercial
"exploitation," that finally prompted the articulation of a public
policy. 244
Congress determined that the regulatory framework contained in
the 1990 Act satisfied the First Amendment standards pertaining to
commercial speech,245 and that the "proposal to limit the quantity of
commercial time during children's programming fully" met constitu-
tional requirements.246 Congress reasoned that the protection of chil-
dren met the requisite "substantial government interest" requirement
and that the adopted regulatory approach "directly" advanced that
interest; the regulation was, therefore, appropriately "narrow" and
"nonintrusive. '247
The 1990 Act's passage also necessitated an analysis by Congress
of the First Amendment implications associated with the requirement
248ththat broadcasters provide educational programming. In finding the
statute's provisions to be constitutional, Congress stated:
242. Id. at 6.
243. Id. The Conference Report accompanying the 1990 Act stated, "It is well estab-
lished by scientific evidence that children are uniquely susceptible to the persuasive
messages contained in television advertising .... [Children] lack the perceptual capabili-
ties ... and the ability to recognize the persuasive intent that necessarily underlies all
television advertising." Id.
244. Id. at 6-7.
245. Congress argued that the three-prong test delineated by the Supreme Court in
Central Hudson Gas was the appropriate standard to apply. That test requires: (1) the
existence of a substantial government interest served by the restriction, (2) that the restric-
tion directly advance that government interest, and (3) that the restriction be no more
extensive than necessary to serve that government interest. Id. at 9 (citing Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)).
246. Id. at 9.
247. Id. Congress opined that the statutory provision requiring the FCC to consider a
television licensee's compliance with the 1990 Act during the license renewal process was
also constitutionally valid: "It is well established that in exchange for 'the free and exclu-
sive use of a valuable part of the public domain,' a broadcaster can be required to act as a
public fiduciary, obligated to serve the needs and interests of its area." Id. at 10 (quoting
Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 997, 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1966)).
248. 47 U.S.C. § 303(b)(a)(2) (Supp. III 1991); Educational and Informational Pro-
gramming for Children, 47 C.F.R. § 73.671 (1992). The Conference Report noted the
Supreme Court's recognition of legislative power to regulate programming aimed at chil-
dren, "even where the exercise of such power would be prohibited by the First Amend-
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Recognition that children are a unique and special concern of the
state transcends the particular nature of the medium. State action
aimed at protecting children repeatedly has survived First Amend-
ment attack whether the regulation concerned written work, cine-
matography or radio and television. Government has a right to
'adopt more stringent controls on communicative materials avail-
able to youths than on those available to adults.' This results from
the fact that a child . . . is not possessed of that full capacity for
individual choice which is the presupposition of the First Amend-
ment guarantees.2 49
Of particular importance was Congress' assertion that a broad-
caster's public interest obligation included "render[ing] public service
to children. '250 Children were described as the "bedrock" upon which
the society rested.2 51 Congress reasoned, therefore, that the substan-
tial amounts of television that children viewed obligated broadcasters,
as public fiduciaries, to provide programming that served children's
"informational and educational" needs:
252
The broadcaster's public service obligation includes a responsibility
to provide diversified programming designed to meet the varied
needs of the child audience. In this regard, educational or informa-
tional programming for children is of particular importance. It
seems to us that the use of television to further the educational and
cultural development of America's children bears a direct relation-
ship to the licensee's obligation under the Communications Act to
operate in the 'public interest.'
25 3
In assessing whether the statute's "education and information"
provisions complied with First Amendment standards applicable to
broadcasting, Congress determined that the regulations served a "sub-
stantial government interest" in a "narrowly tailored" manner.25 4
Congress offered that the "welfare of our children" standard consti-
tuted the requisite "substantial" government interest. As to whether
the regulatory provisions were sufficiently tailored to withstand con-
ment for adults." H.R. REP. No. 385 at 8 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749
(1978)).
The Conference Report further noted the Court's statement in Ginsburg v. New York
that "the government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting 'parents'
claim to authority in their own household' justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression." Id. (citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
249. H.R. REP,. No. 385 at 8-9 (quoting Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 636-41; Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
250. Id. at 11. "[S]uch public service obviously cannot consist solely of meeting the
entertainment needs of children, any more than it would in the case of adults." Id. (citing
FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981)).
251. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1943)).
252. Id. at 10-11.
253. Id. at 11 (quoting Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
254. Id. (citing FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 634 (1984) (noting a different
Supreme Court First Amendment standard when evaluating the broadcast field)).
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stitutional scrutiny, Congress argued in the affirmative.255 Because
the provisions did "not exclude any programming that [did] in fact
serve the educational and informational needs of children" and "the
broadcaster [had] discretion to meet its public service obligation in the
way it [deemed] best suited," the 1990 Act met the applicable First
Amendment standards.256
In promulgating the regulations necessitated by the Children's
Television Act of 1990, the FCC concurred with the legal principles of
Congress. In fact, the Commission noted that even had the proposals
been "found to be content-based restrictions on speech," they still
would have been constitutionally valid because "some restrictions on
content [are] permissible when applied to broadcasting. ' 257 Acknowl-
edging the government's substantial interest in furthering the educa-
tion and welfare of children through the implementation of the
statute, the FCC explained that the courts have long recognized a
compelling governmental interest in "safeguarding the physical and
psychological well being of a minor. 258
The governmental interest in safeguarding the welfare of children
has also prompted Congress and the FCC to investigate the effects of
television violence.259 In 1969, Congress requested that the Surgeon
General initiate such an investigation.26 ° The Surgeon General's re-
port, issued in 1972, made preliminary findings that "indicat[ed] a
causal relation between viewing violence on television and aggressive
behavior. 2 61 As a result, Congress directed the FCC to report on
"specific positive actions taken or planned by the Commission to pro-
255. Id.
256. Id. at 12.
257. In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of
Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 6308, para. 66 (1995).
258. Id. para. 67 (quoting Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1343
n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The Commission also explained that its regulatory actions consti-
tuted the requisite "compelling government interest." Id. Members of the Senate found it
"difficult to think of an interest more substantial than the promotion of the welfare of
children who watch so much television and rely upon it for so much of the information they
receive." S. Rep. No. 227, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1989).
259. There has been a long history of congressional concern over the impacts of televi-
sion violence upon young children. The Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Juvenile Delinquency conducted investigations into the matter in 1954, 1955, 1961-62, and
1964. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C. 2d
418 (1975). See Ballard, supra note 118 for an overview of the forty-year history of govern-
mental action.
260. Surgeon General's Report by the Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and
Social Behavior: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Comm. of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972).
261. SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC COMM. ON TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR,
TELEVISION AND GROWING Up: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE 18-19 (1972).
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tect children from excessive programming of violence and
obscenity." '262
In the past several years, congressional interest in television vio-
lence and its effects on children has escalated.263 As one commenta-
tor has noted:
In 1993 alone, three congressional hearings spanning eight days
were held to address [television violence], and no fewer than ten
bills and resolutions on the topic were introduced
... Attorney General Janet Reno warned that if television violence
is not reduced, '[g]overnment action will be imperative. . .
.. According to a recent poll, '[n]early four out of five Americans
believe violence in television entertainment programs directly con-
tributes to the amount of violence in society,' and fifty-four percent
of those polled would support government guidelines to limit tele-
vised violence . 264
It is beyond question that the barrage of legislative proposals was
based on the supposition that television violence had harmful effects
on children. One legal commentator explains that the countless
number of legislative initiatives were premised on the belief that "re-
ducing television violence would produce some measurable societal
good, ' 265 such as "protect[ing] children from the physical and mental
harm resulting from violence contained in television programs. '266
The legislative proposals justified the regulation of broadcasting, in
varying degrees,267 by citing "empirical evidence [showing] that chil-
262. H.R. REP. No. 1139, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
263. In response to congressional concerns, the broadcast industry (ABC, CBS, and
NBC) adopted new standards to reduce television violence: violent images must be rele-
vant to the "development of character or advancement of the plot" and may 'not be "gratu-
itous or excessive" or "depicted as glamorous or a solution to human conflict." Ballard,
supra note 118, at 175-76. The major networks have also introduced the "Advance Paren-
tal Advisory" plan, which will provide varying warnings to parents that the materials to
follow are too violent for children. Id.; see also Paul Farhi, Drawing a Bead on TV Vio-
lence, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at Fl; Paul Farhi, The Big Battle Over Kids' TV: Bert
and Ernie vs. Biker Mice, WASH. POST, Oct, 31, 1995, at D1.
264. Ballard, supra note 118, at 175-76 (citations omitted); see also S. 1383, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
H.R. Res. 202, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. Res. 122, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). None
of the legislative proposals, however, were adopted during the 103d Congress. Ballard,
supra note 118, at 184.
265. Ballard, supra note 118, at 184.
266. S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
267. The congressional proposals fell into five distinct categories: (1) "zoning" televi-
sion violence, which prohibits violent programming during the hours children are reason-
ably likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience; (2) imposing sanctions on
broadcasters, which include license revocation and civil fines for failing to reduce violence;
(3) requiring warnings, which include video and audio warnings that a program contains
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dren exposed to violent video programming at a young age have a
higher tendency for violent and aggressive behavior later in life than
those children not so exposed. 268
Though none of the legislative proposals were enacted, the effort
mounted by the 103d Congress evinces a substantial commitment to
the welfare of America's children. It is clear that when reacting to the
harmful effects of television on the physical and psychological well-
being of children, Congress, the FCC, and the courts act homogene-
ously. Most importantly, they view the "public interest" obligations of
broadcasters as outweighing the traditional constitutional protections
accorded by the First Amendment.
3. Regulating Televised Racial Stereotyping: A Compelling State Interest
To minimize the effects of televised negative racial imagery, Con-
gress and the FCC must acknowledge the glaring similarities be-
tween racial stereotyping and the categories of broadcasting already
deemed appropriate for regulation-sex269 and violence. 270 Equally
obvious is the plausible analogy between requiring accurate and
positive programming relating to individuals of different ethnic
and racial backgrounds271  and the congressional mandate
violence or unsafe gun practices; (4) requiring the FCC to publish lists of the most violent
programming, including the sponsors of the programs; and (5) requiring new television sets
to include circuitry, known as the "Violence" or "V" chip, to block programming encoded
with a violence warning. Ballard, supra note 118, at 182-84.
268. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (quoted in Ballard, supra note 118, at 184).
Though questioning the validity of the research data, Ballard notes that "two of the bills
assert that 'three Surgeon Generals, the National Institute of Mental Health, the Center
for Disease Control, the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pedi-
atrics, and the American Psychological Association have concurred for nearly 20 years as
to the deleterious effects of television violence on children."' Ballard, supra note 118, at
185 (quoting S. 1811, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1993) and H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2 (1993). One Senate bill even suggests that this abundance of social science data estab-
lishes the requisite "compelling governmental interest in limiting the negative influences of
violent video programming on children." Id. (referring to S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1993)).
269. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949
(1992); discussion supra note 237.
270. See discussion supra notes 238-259.
271. Kurt Wimmer argues that "the media possess the power to change perceptions,
and, if properly encouraged, may change perception of racial prejudices and discrimina-
tion. This power of the law could positively reorder social conceptions of justice, and insti-
gate a change in mindset that could result in a decrease in race-based stratification."
Wimmer, supra note 34, at 406. He warns that "[i]f broadcast media are not encouraged to
address minority issues and continually misrepresent minorities, social distances that per-
petuate societal stratification could be exacerbated." Id.
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to provide children with informational and educational program-
ming.272
Congress has justified its legislative enactments and regulatory
constraints on television broadcasters by referring to the "integral
part" that television plays in a child's life.273 Congress has found it
necessary to exercise its legislative powers when confronted by the
realities of children's television-viewing habits. Congress has ob-
served that "by the time the average child is 18 years old, he or she
has spent between 10,000 [and] 15,000 hours watching television...
ha[ving] spent more time watching television than he or she spends in
school. "274
Social science data reveal that African-American children watch
"nearly twice" as much television as white children and often acquire
their "values, beliefs, concepts, attitudes and basic socialization pat-
terns" from viewing television. 275 Overwhelming research findings
suggest that media distortion negatively impacts the self-esteem of Af-
rican-American children and may also preclude them from achieving
self-actualization.276 Studies have even suggested that the potential
negative effects associated with television viewership range from "in-
citing violence" and "aggression," to "antisocial behavior. '277 Re-
search also reveals that "white children are more likely than black
children to learn about the other race from television. "278 "Forty per-
cent of the white children" in one study "attribute[d] their knowl-
edge" about how African-Americans "look, talk, and dress" to the
images they see in their living rooms.279
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "[o]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited
First Amendment protection. '280 The Court has held that the unique-
ness of the medium is based on its "pervasive presence in the lives of
all Americans" and its accessibility to children.281 The constitutional
standards, as determined by the Court, tolerate broadcast regulation
272. See Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303b (a)(2) (1991) (requiring
broadcaster to make an effort to air programming that benefits the educational and infor-
mational needs of children); discussion supra notes 239-248 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 3 and text accompanying notes 92-97.
276. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
277. See suprq note 101.
278. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
280. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
281. Id. at 748-50.
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that merely imposes an "incidental burden on speech. ' 282 Conse-
quently, the government may place "limited content restraints, and
impose certain affirmative obligations on broadcasters" if such restric-
tions are narrowly tailored and further a substantial governmental
interest.283
Although Congress and the FCC cannot tell a broadcaster what
to program, they can prevent or modify categories of programming
where a substantial governmental interest exists.284 Protecting chil-
dren from the harms of racial stereotyping clearly constitutes the gov-
ernmental interest necessary to justify the imposition of race-neutral
broadcast regulations.285
D. Proposed Alternative Regulatory Approaches
Congress, the courts, and the FCC have acknowledged that
broadcasters have a responsibility to serve their communities, and
have a particular and unique obligation to serve the special needs of
children.286 Moreover, because television broadcasters are deemed
"trustees of a valuable public resource," the government has imposed
requirements and guidelines ranging from restrictions on television vi-
olence and indecency to the affirmative obligation to provide educa-
tional and informational programming. Consequently, in developing
regulatory proposals to combat negative imagery effectively,287 it is
reasonable to review and analyze the regulatory methodologies al-.,
ready attempted by governmental entities.
The regulatory framework devised by Congress and the FCC to
provide children with programming that is educational and informa-
282. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 218-219 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 245-248 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
286. In re Petition of Action for Children's TV (ACT) for Rule Making, Children's
Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, para. 15 (1974).
287. One commentator defines "negative imagery" as "stereotypical imagery of a group
of people which may induce a loss of self-esteem and a feeling of inferiority ... [and] may
create negative perceptual stereotypical self-attributions ... [that] are inclusive of values,
attitudes, behaviors, and standards." CosBY, supra note 25, at 8.
Professors Evuleocha and Ugbah, in discussing the portrayals of Blacks in American
media, explain the intricacies of stereotyping. See supra note 93. They note that the defini-
tions of stereotyping range from a cognitive skill (a form of mental categorizing which
allows us to organize information) to the inverting of cause and effect (an effect of the
subordinate position of Blacks in a racist society is represented as a single, racial character-
istic-Blacks are less intelligent than Whites by nature). Id. Although not all stereotypes
are bad, they conclude that "when [stereotypes] are used to serve the function of purveying
bourgeois and racist ideology to the mass public throughout the world.., especially casting
Blacks . . . in a demeaning and less than dignified light, then there is a grave cause for
concern." Evuleocha & Ugbah, supra note 93, at 199-200.
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tional provides an appropriate model for consideration.288 The gov-
ernment has, within the existing constitutional framework, the
authority to encourage broadcasters to air programming that contains
racial and ethnic images that are balanced, factual, and appropriate as
role models289 for African-American children. 290
288. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
289. The role model theory has been rejected by-the courts as violative ofequal protec-
tion jurisprudence. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986) (re-
jecting the role model argument in relation to employing and retaining African-American
teachers because it has no logical stopping point); Britton v. South Bend Community
School Corp., 819 F.2d 766, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (role model theory leads to
racial balancing), cert. denied., 484 U.S. 925 (1987). The role model theory was rejected in
Wygant because the Court was not persuaded that the disparity between teachers and stu-
dents constituted proof of prior racial discrimination. 476 U.S. at 294. However, when
addressed in a First Amendment context, the harm to children which results from the lack
of positive, accurate African-American images on television creates a substantial govern-
ment interest in preventing that harm. See Tabor, supra note 63, at 630-31 (exposing chil-
dren to only white role models is dangerous in an ethnically diverse society).
290. See supra notes 261-269 and accompanying text. One social scientist opines that
the broadcast industry could, with little difficulty, begin the task of redefining the images of
African-Americans in television programming: "Television hegemonic strata should termi-
nate their practices of hiring, financing, and encouraging African-American writers, direc-
tors, producers, and actors to create negative imageries of African-Americans while
excluding African-American writers, directors, producers, and actors who wish to create
positive imageries of African-Americans." COSBY, supra note 25, at 136-37.
Critics will raise as an issue the difficulty, if not implausibility, of determining what
television imagery constitutes improper racial stereotyping. I acknowledge the complexity
of the task, but note that the broadcasting industry has responded to comparable chal-
lenges in developing guidelines relating to "excessive violence." See discussion supra note
274. As expected, the industry is addressing the problem by utilizing the talents, experi-
ence, and training of educators, social scientists, and members of its 'industry. See Paul
Farhi, Drawing a Bead on TV Violence: Study Finds Crime-Time Shows Improve; Movies,
Kids' Programs Still a Concern, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at Fl. Farhi's article reports
on the 190-page study conducted at the behest of the broadcasting industry on the 121 TV
series that aired last season. The study found that some improvements had occurred, but
recommended that the networks schedule violence-laden shows after 9:00 p.m. Id. The
study also recommended that the industry re-examine policies regarding promotional an-
nouncements, rethink the airing of violent theatrical movies, reduce the amount of fighting
on kids' shows, and apply advisories more consistently. Id. Of significance is Farhi's obser-
vation that the research is "inevitably controversial because few academics agree on what
precisely constitutes an act of violence." Id.
Fashioning appropriate guidelines for determining what constitutes "racial stereotyp-
ing" will require an equivalent combined effort of industry members, social scientists, edu-
cators, and government officials. Such a collaborative undertaking has fortunately already
begun. The Anti-Defamation League conducted a symposium in Washington, D.C. on
June 2, 1995, entitled Children, Television & Prejudice. The program consisted of a group
of distinguished panelists, who discussed the issue of televised racial stereotyping, its im-
pacts on children, and the possible solutions. Representing the affected parties of interest
were Ray Suarez (National Public Radio), Michael Benjamin (Director, Institute of Mental
Health Initiatives), Dr. Helen Boehm (Vice President, Children's Network, Fox), Dr. Jan-
nette Dates (Dean, School of Communications, Howard University), Dr. Renee Hobbs
(Professor, Harvard Institute on Media Education), Dr. Valeria Lovelace (Director of Re-
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In enacting legislation that imposed children's programming re-
sponsibilities on the broadcasting industry, Congress reasoned that
"the use of television" in furtherance of the "development of
America's children" was an integral part of a "licensee's obligation"
to "operate in the public interest." '291 In addition, studies have found
that "television can be used effectively to convey important and posi-
tive messages about social behavior. '292 Hence, research that suggests
the media's portrayal of African-Americans as violent, mentally infer-
ior, irresponsible, and corrupt, could have severe social implications
for minority children 293 and provides a correlative basis for govern-
ment to prescribe comparable regulatory requirements.
Any effort to implement regulatory policy that assures that televi-
sion programming will project balanced racial images must begin with
a recognition by the executive members of the industry that a problem
of racial stereotyping exists.294 The industry, in concert with educa-
tors, parents, social scientists, and federal pplicy makers, could then
initiate a partnership providing the essential forum for defining plausi-
ble solutions. The partnership could address programming issues and
identify effective ways of achieving "constructive improvements" in
the home and in the schools.295
The American Psychological Association, in a 1992 report on the
effects of television on children, also provided guidance in combatting
the harms associated with racial stereotyping.296 The report recom-
search, Children's Television Network), Lisa Navarrete (Director, National Council of La
Raza), and Marc Silver (Editor, US News and World Report) (partial transcript of the ses-
sion on file with the author).
291. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
292. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 6308, para. 10 (1995).
293. See Wimmer, supra note 34, at 343 (citing Berry, Television and Afro-Americans:
Past Legacy and Present Portrayals in TELEVISION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: BEYOND VIO-
LENCE AND CHILDREN 247 (S. Whitney & R. Abeles eds. 1980)); see also Carolyn A.
Stroman, The Socialization Influence of Television on Black Children, 15 J. BLACK STUD.
79, 84-87 (1984).
294. As stated by the FCC in one of its earlier proceedings relating to the prohibition of
indecent programming:
In the final analysis, the medium of television cannot live up to its potential in
serving America's children unless individual broadcasters are genuinely commit-
ted to that task, and are willing-to a considerable extent-to put profit in second
place and the children in first. While government reports and regulations can
correct some of the more apparent abuses, they cannot create a sense of commit-
ment to children where it does not already exist.
1974 Policy Statement, supra note 226, para. 59.
295. See, e.g., In re Children's Television Programming and Advertising Practices, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, 159 (1979) (comments of Dr. Rosemary
Lee Potter).
296. COSBY, supra note 25, at 133.
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mended that parents "encourage [their] children ... to meet people
from different ethnic or social backgrounds" and instruct children in
"critical viewing."2 97 In her study, Dr. Cosby proposes that the devel-
opment of "critical viewing skills" begins with "educators con-
struct[ing] curricula that will help to counter television's possible
influence on elementary and high school children's self-percep-
tions,. 298 as well as their opinions of others.299
The congressional proposals introduced to restrict, reduce, and
eliminate televised violence also offer appropriate regulatory exam-
ples.3 °° In an effort to shield minors from racial stereotyping, the gov-
ernment could impose scheduling requirements on the hours within
which racially stereotypical programs could be aired.30' The govern-
ment could require the use of audio and video warnings before and
during the applicable programs,30 2 and could institute an FCC compli-
ance procedure that would be conducted at the time each broadcast
licensee applied for renewal.30 3
297. Id.
298. Id. at 134.
299. Id Though Dr. Cosby addresses her recommendations to both elementary and
high school children, the proposal contained herein is limited to children of preschool,
primary school, and elementary school age. Age-specificity is of primary importance in the
area of informational programming, in that younger children are unusually susceptible to
receiving and learning messages of racial distinctions. See supra note 109. For example,
many preschool children rely on television for information because they cannot read or
access alternative sources of information. See In re Children's Television Programming
and Advertising Practices, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, para. 22
(1979).
300. See supra notes 275-279 and accompanying text.
301. Stereotypical programming that contains materials deemed unsuited for viewing
by young children should not be broadcast between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. on any day.
See discussion supra note 199 and accompanying text.
302. The audio and video advisory warnings could be shown at the outset of each pro-
gram. During the course of the program, an appropriate symbol could be placed in the
corner of the screen to warn those viewers who tune in while the program is in progress
that it may not be appropriate for viewing by young children. See Report on the Broadcast
of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418, 420 (1975). An advance
notice of the warnings could also be submitted to network affiliates for inclusion in local
TV guides and newspapers, program listings, and promotional materials. See In re Policies
and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming, Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 10 FCC Rcd. 6308 (1995).
303. See In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 10 FCC Rcd. 6308 (1995). The FCC, in its pending Children's Television
proceeding, has even suggested that the licensee's present obligation to file annual reports
could be augmented to require that applicable data be maintained to allow parents, educa-
tors, and interest groups to play a more meaningful role in both the renewal process and
ongoing monitoring efforts during the course of a station's license term. Id. Such a report-
ing requirement would be equally appropriate to apply in the efforts to monitor and en-
force guidelines relating to racial stereotyping.
These regulatory proposals are expressly the kind of targeted
governmental action required by constitutional standards. The rec-
ommendations are no more extensive than necessary to accomplish
the affected governmental interest.3 °4 Consequently, because they are
narrowly focused, nonintrusive in nature, and distinctly limited in ap-
plication to children's programs-the time limits, advisory warnings,




Theories, beliefs and acts of racism have been legislatively and
legally rejected by American society.306 Intuitively, one can see the
existence of an interrelationship between acts of racial discrimination
and racism. It has been observed that the "[p]revalence of racism or
racial prejudice is likely to encourage racial discrimination. Con-
versely, allowing racial discrimination is likely to encourage the
spread of racism and racial prejudice. '30 7 Therefore, a society that
condones racism is a society that will experience acts of racial discrim-
ination. Consequently, any effort to eliminate racial discrimination
without a comparable assault on its motivator, racism, will by neces-
sity fail. This fact informs the proposition that the abolishment of ra-
cial discrimination is critical to the eradication of racial prejudice.
Stated differently, because racial discrimination substantially influ-
ences the beliefs, values, and behavior of others, its destruction will
effectively remove one of the sources of racism. The elimination of
304. See supra notes 230-236 and accompanying text. The proposals proffered are
clearly less intrusive than the ban on editorializing at non-commercial stations that the
Supreme Court held violated First Amendment protections in FCC v. League of Women
Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 385 (1984). Furthermore, the proposals denote "no threat that a
broadcaster would be denied permission to carry a particular program or to publish its own
view." Id. at 378. The Court explained that its ruling prohibiting the ban on editorializing
was "narrow" in scope and did "not hold that the Congress or the FCC is without power to
regulate the content, timing or character of speech." Id. at 402.
305. In 1979, in an effort to improve TV service for children, the FCC even considered
imposing a mandatory requirement that specific programming categories be provided for
children by the broadcasting industry. See In re Children's Television Programming and
Advertising Practices, Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 75 F.C.C.2d 138, para. 35 (1979).
306. Commentator David Kretzmer notes that "most modem democracies have en-
acted statues which outlaw discrimination." David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Ra-
cism, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 447 (1987) (emphasis added).
307. Id. at 453.
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racial stereotyping from television provides corresponding societal
benefits, aiding the reduction of racial prejudice from our society.308
Congress, the courts, the FCC, and the broadcasting industry
must acknowledge the harm racial stereotyping inflicts on African-
American children in particular, and the American society as a whole.
It is essential that as a nation, we purge children's television program-
ming of racist imageries. "We must be careful that because of their
youth and inexperience, children are far more trusting of and vulnera-
ble to blatant and subliminal messages," 309 and therefore cannot dis-
tinguish conceptually between what is real and what is fatally false.
Given the potential harms associated with negative racial imagery and
the racial dissention and divisiveness that continues to plague the na-
tion, it is imperative that immediate legislative and regulatory actions
be taken to address this most compelling government interest.
308. Some commentators have proposed eliminating racist speech because (1) racism or
racist speech is highly offensive and may therefore cause friction and possible violence;
protecting the public peace therefore justifies restricting individual rights; and (2) the in-
dignities suffered by individuals targeted with racist speech in a society that professes to
embrace political and social ideals of equality justify the fashioning of appropriate legal
restrictions on racial misconduct. See id. at 456.
309. 1974 Policy Statement, supra note 226, para. 34.
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